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Oliver North rouses strong passions from all sides of the
political spectrum. Some find that North evokes a message of
patriotism, heroism, and all that is good with the United
States. To these people he epitomizes the soldier who self-
lessly sacrifices himself for the safety and security of his
country.' For others, however, North projects a more sinister
image.' For these people North portrays secret government
run amuck: government acting in disregard of its own laws
with little accountability and without popular direction.3
North, of course, played a part in the infamous Iran-Contra
scandal, where government agents allegedly dealt arms to Iran
and unlawfully4 diverted the proceeds to the Nicaraguan
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1. See Patrick J. Buchanan, You've Won Mr. President; Now Pardon Ollie
and John, WASH. POST, July 19, 1987, at C1 ("America [has] openly rooted for Ollie
North, and against the Sanhedrin of hypocrites trying to tear him down.").
2. See Richard Lacayo, "A Partial Vindication": The North Trial Ends with
an Equivocal Verdict-And Many Unanswered Questions, TIME, May 15, 1989, at 34,
35 ("The public has been sharply divided about North since the scandal burst into the
headlines in 1986.... [Miany consider him a rogue who set out to thwart the lawful
conduct of foreign policy . . ").
3. One commentator described the situation as follows:
The para-state had its own budget, raised from arms sales and hostage trading
and drug dealing. It had its own foreign policy. It had its own air force and its
own police. It had its own diplomats. It had commodious quarters in the Old
Executive Office Building and in the White House. Its officials and its
mercenaries lied to the elected representatives of the American people. It
waged a war Congress did not declare. Most of all, the para-state had the same
president as the legitimate state.
Christopher Hitchens, A Few Questions for Poindexter: He Could Have Much to Say
About Iran-Contra, HARPER'S MAG., Jan. 1990, at 70, 75.
4. The Boland Amendments banned military aid to the Contras throughout
much of the Nicaraguan civil war. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 4-4, at 222-23 (2d ed. 1988). The Boland Amendment in
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Contras.' But North, notwithstanding his pivotal role, was
not the king of the operation, nor even a rook. He was a
simple pawn-in the words of Judge Gesell, a "low-level
subordinate working to carry out initiatives of a few cynical
superiors."6
Strangely, only a handful of government officials have been
prosecuted in connection with the scandal,7 though undoubtedly
effect at the time of North's actions prohibited any "entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities" from expending funds "for the purpose or which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or indi-
vidual." Boland Amendment to Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1838, 1935 (1984) (effective from Oct. 12, 1984 to Dec. 19,
1985); see also Boland Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
99-169, § 105, 99 Stat. 1002, 1003 (1984) (putting a similar restriction in effect until
Oct. 18, 1986); United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 375,377 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988) (citing
the Boland Amendments under which North was initially charged). Whether the
Boland Amendments were actually violated is a question that can only be answered
in a court of law. See Southern Air Transp., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 877
F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that a news media's depiction of Iran-
Contra as involving "illegal" activities was only opinion and not fact). The Reagan
Administration denied any wrongdoing in relation to the transactions that took place.
See U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE
NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION & U.S. HousE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS
TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGAT-
ING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 293-304 (majority report), 489-99 (minority report) (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-
CONTRA INVESTIGATION REPORT].
5. North was initially charged with conspiring to defraud the government
by violating the Boland Amendments, see United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 375,
377-78 (D.D.C. 1988), although he was actually tried only for the related offenses of
(1) aiding and abetting an obstruction of Congress, (2) altering, concealing, and
destroying National Security Council documents, (3) receiving an illegal gratuity,
(4) obstructing and lying to Congress, (5) obstructing a congressional inquiry, (6)
obstructing a presidential inquiry, (7) improper conversion of traveler's checks, and
(8) conspiring to defraud the government of tax revenue, see Lacayo, supra note 2, at
34. North was convicted of the first three listed charges, but all three convictions
were reversed on appeal. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 851-52, modified,
920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2235 (1991). The court of
appeals reversed because of a danger that the convictions were tainted by North's
immunized testimony. 910 F.2d at 852. Following remand, the independent
prosecutor dismissed all charges against North. See Elaine S. Povich, Use of
Immunity Leads to Dismissal of North Charges, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 1991, § 1, at 1.
6. Iran-Contra: North Gets Fine, Not Jail Term, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1704
(1989) (quoting Judge Gesell).
7. Admiral John M. Poindexter, a national security adviser to Reagan, was
charged with and convicted of conspiring to defraud the government and obstructing
congressional inquiries. His convictions, however, were reversed on appeal. United
States v. Poindexter, No. 90-3125, slip op. at 2, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 15, 1991).
Richard Secord, a former Air Force major general, pleaded guilty to lying to Congress
about the Iran-Contra affair and is currently on probation. See Secord, Striking New
Deal, Drops Appeal of Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at A20. Robert C.
FALL 1991] Accountability and Section 1983
others in the Reagan Administration were involved. Whether
and how far the investigation proceeds is yet to be seen.9
Much of the nation, however, appears weary of the expense
and political divisiveness and is willing to accept the case as
closed.'
McFarlane, also a national security adviser to Reagan, pleaded guilty to four counts
of withholding information from Congress. See The Iran-Contra Figures and Their
Status, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at A24. Joseph F. Fernandez, a former CIA station
chief in Costa Rica, wasindicted twice for his alleged role in helping North establish
a network to supply the Contras. See id. Charges against Fernandez were dropped,
however, after Attorney General Richard Thornburgh refused to permit access to
classified CIA information. See Walter Pincus, Walsh to Drop Prosecution of Former
CIA Operative, Iran-Contra Documents Barred from Fernandez Trial, WASH. POST,
Oct. 13, 1990, at Al. Alan D. Fiers, Jr., former chief of the CIA's Central American
Task Force, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges of withholding information from
Congress. See Iran Arms Case Given New Life in Plea Bargain, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1991, at Al. Elliott Abrams, former Reagan administration policy chief on Latin
American affairs, pleaded guilty to two counts of withholding information from
Congress. See Ex-Reagan Aide Guilty in Iran-Contra Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1991,
§ 1, at 2. Clair George, former deputy director of operations for the CIA, has been
indicted for lying to three congressional panels and a federal grand jury investigating
the Iran-Contra affair. See George Lardner, Jr. & Walter Pincus, Ex-CIA Covert
Chief Indicted, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al, A22. Finally, Duane R. Clarridge,
a former CIA official, has been indicted for lying to congressional and presidential
committees investigating the shipment of arms to Iran. See Ex-CIA Agent Indicted
for Lying About Iran Deal, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991, § 3, at 3.
8. Following North's trial one of the jurors told reporters: "I think there
were people higher up who gave him the authority to do a lot of things, and then
when he got caught out there high and dry, no one came to help him." Lacayo, supra
note 2, at 35. Polls sponsored by Time Magazine and the Cable News Network
suggest that a majority of Americans believe George Bush was personally involved
in at least some of North's actions. Id. And, of course, many believe Ronald Reagan
was personally involved in the entire affair. Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House
Iran-Contra Committee, has stated: "My sense is that my colleagues are where an
overwhelming majority of the American people are: They believe President Reagan
and Bush were more deeply involved in Iran-contra than either of them have
indicated." Christopher Madison, Iran-Contra Revisited, NAT'L J., May 27, 1989, at
1298, 1300. Gary Sick, a member of Jimmy Carter's National Security Council,
recently reported that the roots of the Iran-Contra affair might reach all the way
back to the 1980 presidential campaign. Sick has suggested that Reagan campaign
officials in the fall of 1980 negotiated to provide arms to Iran in exchange for
delaying release of American hostages. See Gary Sick, The Election Story of the
Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1991, at A17.
9. A grand jury has been convened to further investigate the extent to which
officials in the Reagan Administration helped to deceive Congress in connection with
the sale of arms to Iran and covert aid to the Contras. North has testified before that
grand jury. See North Testifies at Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1990, at A8.
Although the grand jury's term was scheduled for only 18 months and should have
now expired, it was still in session at the close of the year. See George Lardner, Jr.,
Iran-Contra Probe: Light at End of Tunnel, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1991, at A19.
10. See Hitchens, supra note 3, at 74 ("[S]o many professional Washingtonians
will tell you that 'putting it all behind us' is better for the republic, for democracy.");
Madison, supra note 8, at 1299 (reporting that a poll conducted by Louis Harris and
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Regardless of whether its factual underpinnings are ever
fully disclosed, Iran-Contra offers a dramatic paradigm for
examining our philosophy of accountability in government.
Granted, exploring the historical question of exactly who was
involved might now be useless.11 We probably can never
learn the answer and may not even want to know. 2 So far
as the exact details of the Iran-Contra affair go, it might be
best to let sleeping dogs lie and move on.
But Iran-Contra, together with its fabled cast, can still teach
us something about government accountability on a more
abstract level. Act one presents the perennial fall-guy, Oliver
North, claiming to have done only what he thought his supe-
riors wanted. 3 The second act offers several members of the
National Security Council pleading the classical "I didn't
know" or "I wasn't involved" defenses. 4 And the epilogue
sadly finds the audience, though perhaps not believing any of
it, nodding and thinking, "Well, if they didn't know, if they
weren't actually involved, then that's okay." 5
Associates, Inc. found "62 per cent of Americans agreeing that it was time for the
country to give Reagan the benefit of the doubt and put the Iran-contra affair behind
us"); Let the Iran-contra Story End, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1991, § 1, at 20 ("Walsh
should turn out the lights and go home.").
11. See Madison, supra note 8, at 1298-1300.
12. According to one commentator:
We may have to wait years to learn exactly how it was that, in the age of piety
and iron, a group of men short-circuited Congress, suborned the Justice
Department, debauched the Treasury, all in order to strengthen the hand of the
Ayatollah and to slay Nicaraguans they had never met or cared about and...
but forget it. Forget it if you can.
Hitchens, supra note 3, at 75.
13. See Iran-Contra: North's Trial Tests Defense of Obeying Higher-Ups, 47
CONG. Q. WKLY. 597, 597 (1989). North, however, failed to convince Judge Gesell
that Reagan should be compelled to testify. Judge Gesell, following presentation of
the independent counsel's case against North, stated: "The trial record presently
contains no proof that defendant North ever received any authorization from Presi-
dent Reagan to engage in the illegal conduct alleged, either directly or indirectly,
orally or in writing." Iran-Contra: Judge Refuses to Compel Testimony by Reagan,
47 CONG. Q. WKLY. 709 (Apr. 1, 1989).
14. See IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 273, 293-324
(majority report). See also Richard A. Brody & Catherine R. Shapiro, Policy Failure
and Public Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President
Reagan, 11 POL. BEHAV. 353, 358-59 (1989) (table I) (providing a chronology of events
of November 1986); Iran-Contra: Judge Refuses to Compel Testimony by Reagan,
supra note 13, at 709-10 ("In 1987, Reagan told an inquiry commission chaired by
former Sen. John Tower that 'he did not know that the NSC staff was engaged in
helping the contras,' the board reported.").
15. See, e.g., Hitchens, supra note 3, at 72 ("One of Reagan's greatest
triumphs was to transmute a seeming disadvantage-his stupidity-into a folksy
trait and then, in his last two years in office, into what amounted to a plea bargain.").
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But is it? Who is responsible when government violates the
law? Should only the perpetrator be held accountable, or
should higher ranking officials, those "in charge," share
responsibility? Assuming the search does not stop with the
perpetrator, how far should it proceed? Specifically, should an
official who truthfully pleads "I didn't know," or "I didn't do
anything" escape responsibility? Are government officials who
give their subordinates "blank checks"'" beyond reproach?
This Article surveys these questions in the particular
context of state government and section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code.17 Section 1983 is perhaps the most
potent civil weapon available for securing accountability in
government. Of course, section 1983 is not applicable to
federal officers and thus offers little assistance in the unique
case of Oliver North.18  Still, it can be used successfully to
combat the parallel problem involving state officials. In these
all-too-frequent cases, "street-level" 9 government officials
16. "Private blank check" was, ironically, the code word used by North to
communicate directly with Poindexter. See Hitchens, supra note 3, at 72.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
18. Section 1983 only applies to state officials. For actions against federal
officials, one must proceed either under a more specific federal statute or attempt a
Bivens-type action. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971) (allowing a direct action for damages
against federal officials for violating constitutional rights); see also Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (declining to provide Bivens remedies when
Congress already provided remedial measures for constitutional violations that
occurred in the administration of a government program). Though this Article
concerns only § 1983, nothing precludes this analysis from being applied to federal
officers through a Bivens-type action. See, e.g., Washington Square Post 1212 v. City
of N.Y., 720 F. Supp. 337, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (discussing the potential for
supervisory liability under Bivens in much the same way courts have addressed the
liability of state officials under section 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 907 F.2d 1288
(2d Cir. 1990).
19. One commentator has defined "street-level bureaucrats" as "officials [who]
share three common characteristics. They personally deliver basic governmental
services directly to citizens. They occupy the lower rungs of their bureaucratic
ladders. And despite low bureaucratic rank, they exercise substantial discretion in
their daily work." PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS xvii (1983). See also MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAU-
CRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
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(like Oliver North) break the law either because they thought
they were following orders or because they simply were never
instructed to the contrary. Although these street-level
officials are sometimes brought to justice,2° as in the Iran-
Contra scandal, their superiors more often than not escape
unscathed.2'
Society today appears too eager to accept defenses like "I
didn't know" or "I wasn't involved" from those in govern-
ment 22 -excuses that one hundred years ago simply were not
tolerated.23 Our modern ethos appears to expect little from
public servants while tolerating much disservice. This
attitude then reinforces the morality, apparently now shared
by government officials, that responsibility only follows
deliberate wrongdoing. Anything less, whether an indifferent
failure or a careless act, is acceptable.
This Article, while not attempting to explain why this
attitude has permeated our government ethic, pursues the goal
of establishing section 1983 as an available means for remedy-
ing the problem. Specifically, it describes how section 1983
has been and can be used against upper-level government
officials who are careless or derelict in their duties.24
20. Immunity from damage actions often offers protection. See generally Kit
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23
GA. L. REV. 597, 600-34 (1989).
21. See infra notes 50-67.
22. Cf. Hitchens, supra note 3, at 71 ("Attention was concentrated... on the
narrow and hopeless issue of what, if anything, the president knew of the diversion
scheme-narrow because all of what went on under the roof of his White House was
simply and constitutionally his responsibility; hopeless because it was difficult and
always will be to prove actual cognition on Reagan's part.").
23. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
24. Some government officials fall beyond the reach of civil remedial
mechanisms like § 1983. Legislators, see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,372-75
(1951), prosecutors, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,424-25 (1976), and judges,
see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978), are often protected by absolute
immunity, and though potentially subject to suit for injunctive relief, see Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-43 (1984), are normally free from liability in damages. But
see Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942-45 (1991) (declining to extend absolute
immunity to a prosecutor for the act of giving legal advice to the police); Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988) (holding that a state judge is not entitled to
absolute immunity when acting in an administrative capacity). An official who is
acting in a legislative capacity may even prove immune from a suit for injunctive
relief. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 733-34 (1980).
Executive officers, on the other hand, are normally only entitled to qualified immu-
nity. See, e.g., Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1066-67 (2d Cir.
1989) (suit against governor). This Article addresses only the potential for individual
liability in the first instance, and does not purport to assess the propriety of
immunity doctrine. Moreover, the Article focuses on damages from government
Accountability and Section 1983
This discourse does not concern cases involving a high-
ranking ofAcial's "direct" personal violation of federal law. For
example, should an upper-level official discharge or order the
discharge of a subordinate in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, section 1983 clearly applies.25  A high-ranking
government official who perpetrates a constitutional wrong
individually or in concert with others26 is subject to liability
under the same rules as any other state actor.27
officials acting in their individual capacities, and thus will not directly assess
injunctive relief nor will it consider actions against governmental agents acting in
their "official" capacities. See generally Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting that supervisory liability can be established through "personal
direction" or "direct discrimination by the supervisor"); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
1045 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A supervisor is ... liable for constitutional violations of his
subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations . . . ."); Wulf
v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 864 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding liability where a
supervisor recommended discharge in retaliation for First Amendment activity);
Daniel v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 520 N.E.2d 754, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("If [the
supervisor] directed or consented to plaintiff's dismissal, he is liable if that dismissal
is held to be violative of her constitutional rights."), appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1242
(Ill. 1988).
26. By "in concert," I mean either by way of conspiracy theory or through
traditional complicity doctrine. Purpose is required for both. See, e.g., Jones v. City
of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988) ("In a [§ 1983] tort case . . . [tihe
requirements for establishing participation in a conspiracy are the same... as in a
case (criminal or civil) in which conspiracy is a substantive wrong."). Note that
certain conspiracies to deprive persons of civil rights might also implicate 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1988). See, e.g., National Org. of Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d
582 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's injunction against an
antiabortion group and its members, under § 1985(3), for interfering with abortion
rights), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct.
1070 (Feb. 25, 1991); Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 322-23 (8th Cir.
1990) (finding allegations that the Missouri Attorney General participated in a
private conspiracy to deprive women of abortion rights sufficient to state a claim
under § 1985(3)), affd en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (1991); Moore v. City of Columbia, 326
S.E.2d 157, 162-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state a
claim under § 1985(3) because she failed to "allege invidiously discriminatory
animus").
27. See, e.g., Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Supervi-
sors [are] liable for their own actions.... ."); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("A supervisor may be liable if there exists ... his or her personal involve-
ment in the constitutional deprivation. . . ."); Shockey v. City of Portland, 785 P.2d
776, 778 (Or. Ct. App.), review allowed, 795 P.2d 554 (Or. 1990). To be held liable the
supervisor's fault must simply rise to the requisite level for the particular constitu-
tional provision at issue. For instance, to prove a supervisor has violated equal
protection by improperly discharging a subordinate, lower courts have commonly
required purposeful discrimination on the supervisor's part. See, e.g., Trautvetter v.
Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that gender discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause must be intentional). See generally Personnel Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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Likewise, a superior who personally breaches a constitu-
tionally imposed duty, such as the affirmative obligation to
provide medical assistance to inmates,28 is responsible under
section 1983. Whether the superior personally acts in con-
travention of the Constitution or breaches one of its rare
duties,29 liability flows directly from the violation. Because
no unique problems peculiar to the supervisory liability
context arise in these cases, they are not discussed here.
I confine this discussion to the more common predicament
where a street-level official perpetrates a constitutional wrong
without any "direct" participation on behalf of superior
government officers. The assumption is that high-ranking
officers either do not antecedently know of the wrong or do not
actively participate in it. The questions that emerge then are:
first, whether these superior officers should be held responsi-
ble; and second, whether they can be held accountable given
Supreme Court precedent.
I argue that superior officers can and should be held
personally accountable under section 1983 even without direct
participation, or indeed any action at all. I conclude that a
supervisory official who possesses the ability to control
subordinates should be expected to exercise that control
reasonably. If the supervisor fails to perform in a reasonable
fashion he should be held personally accountable for his
subordinates' wrongs.
28. See, e.g., Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 833-34 (11th Cir. 1990); Crooks
v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1989); Oliver v. Townsend, 534 So. 2d 1038, 1043
(Ala. 1988). In these cases, consistent with the constitutional mandate of Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97. 104-05 (1976), courts have found supervisory liability where the
supervisor showed "deliberate indifference" to the medical needs of a prisoner.
29. Omission cases of a constitutional magnitude are rare, at least in differing
theories of liability if not numbers, because the constitution does not normally require
government action; rather, it generally only prohibits it. See, e.g., DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (noting that the
Due Process Clause does not impose a duty on the state to protect life, liberty, and
property interests of citizens against private invasion); Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute granting
absolute immunity to the parole board from liability for harm resulting from the
parole of a prisoner); Commonwealth Bank & Trust v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12, 14-17 (3d
Cir. 1987) (suggesting that state officials do not have a duty to protect members of
the public at large with whom they have no special relationship and who they do not
know are in any danger); see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitu-
tional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) ("My survey ... leaves me convinced
... that in this country government need not actively support everything it may not
forbid."); Daniel A. Farber, Government Liability After DeShaney, TRIAL, May 1989,
at 18 ("[T]he Constitution does not confer a general, judicially enforceable right to
government protection.").
Accountability and Section 1983
Importantly, the duty to control subordinates in this context
should be treated as a wholly federal duty. Courts have
generally looked blindly to state law for supervisory duties.3"
This Article argues that although state law should offer
direction, it should not command the nature and extent of that
inquiry. This approach avoids the doctrinal pitfalls that often
accompany federal inquiries into state law.3' Moreover, it
should alleviate any fears federal courts might have in using
section 1983 to redress incompetence in the upper echelons of
government.
To avoid confusion, I refer to cases that do not involve
"direct" participation by superior government officers as cases
of "derivative" supervisory liability.32 Derivative liability
includes those cases where a supervisor does not actively and
purposely engage in constitutional wrongdoing. In other
words, it includes those cases where the supervisor either acts
only carelessly, or fails to act at all.33
30. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. I do not mean to suggest that "derivative" supervisory liability need be
vicarious. In fact, as will become clear, derivative supervisory liability is not
vicarious at all, because personal fault on behalf of the supervisor is required. See
Larry Kramer & Alan D. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 249, 283 ("Derivative liability on the basis of
negligent failure to supervise a wrongdoer or otherwise to prevent a wrong ... is not
'vicarious' at all, as the derivatively liable party breached its own duty of care.").
Perhaps to avoid the implication that "derivative" means "vicarious," Professor
Nahmod labels a similar approach to supervisory liability a "causation interpre-
tation." See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 3.16, at 172 (2d ed. 1986). Professor Nahmod explains:
"Under this approach, a supervisor need not personally violate the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights. It is enough, where a subordinate does so, that the supervisor acted,
say, negligently or recklessly with regard to preventing the subordinate from
violating the plaintiffs constitutional rights." Id.
33. Because supervisory liability in this context derives from harms inflicted
by subordinates, cases like DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-97,201 (1989) (announcing that the Constitution includes
no general governmental duty of care), do not control the issues addressed in this
Article. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir.
1989) ("Nothing in DeShaney suggests that state officials may escape liability arising
from their policies maintained in deliberate indifference to actions taken by their
subordinates."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990). See generally Jack M. Beermann,
Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of DeShaney, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1079, 1086-96 (arguing that government has a duty to protect the powerless
from private violence). In a typical derivative supervisory liability case a subordinate
has violated the Constitution. The question then is whether the supervisor should
be held accountable. Only in Part IV do I depart from this assumption. See infra
notes 292-332 and accompanying text.
FALL 1991]
62 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:1
Part I of this Article traces the legal history behind deriva-
tive supervisory liability as well as its status today.34 Part
II addresses obstacles that might block the development of
derivative supervisory liability, at least in the federal court
system.35 Part III offers a solution premised on federalizing
the question of duty.36 Finally, Part IV turns to the unique
problem of preserving supervisory liability even in the absence
of constitutional fault by the errant subordinate.37
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT LAW
A. Supervisory Liability Under State Law
In the early- to mid-nineteenth century the rule was estab-
lished throughout the states that a supervisory government
official could be held accountable for a subordinate's wrongful
acts regardless of the supervisor's specific intent or partici-
pation in the subordinate's activities. Courts commonly
recognized that supervisory officials were obligated to oversee
those charged to them; defenses based on a lack of participa-
tion or knowledge thus were not accepted.
What was not so clear in the early- to mid-nineteenth
century was the exact standard of care expected of supervisory
officers. Some states imposed vicarious liability. In those
states, a supervisor was personally responsible for all wrong-
ful actions of her subordinates.39 In others, the standard was
not so severe; rather, the supervisor was expected only to act
34. See infra notes 38-67 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 68-195 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 196-291 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 292-332 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Dabney v. Taliaferro, 25 Va. (4 Rand) 256, 262 (1826) (holding
a sheriff responsible for the negligence of a jailer placed under his charge). See also
M.L. Schellenger, Annotation, Civil Liability of Sheriff or Other Officer Charged with
Keeping Jail or Prison for Death or Injury of Prisoner, 14 A.L.R.2d 353, 358 (1950)
("The majority of cases hold that the sheriff, or other officer having charge of the
prison and the prisoners confined therein, is liable civilly for the acts and omissions
of his deputies when the deputies are acting officially and under color of the office.").
39. See, e.g., Moore's Adm'r v. Dawney, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 127, 129 (1808);
Stuart v. Madison, 5 Va. (1 Call) 481, 482 (1798).
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reasonably.4" Liability for the wrongs of subordinates only
attached where the supervisor negligently failed to perform
her assigned duties.
Under either standard, specific intent or conscious aware-
ness on behalf of the supervisor was not a prerequisite for
liability. The law, reflecting the morality of the times,
expected supervisors to watch carefully over their charges.
Accordingly, excuses resting on lack of direct participation or
knowledge were not readily accepted.
By the time section 1983 was enacted,4' vicarious super-
visory liability had become the exception and not the rule.42
Instead, by the latter part of the nineteenth century super-
visory liability was normally premised on the superior's
negligent failure to live up to the terms of his office. As stated
by one commentator of the times, supervisory liability could
attach in any one of four different settings:
(1) where, being charged with the duty of employing or
retaining his subordinates, he negligently or wilfully em-
ploys or retains unfit or improper persons; or, (2) where,
being charged with the duty to see that they are appointed
or qualified in a proper manner, he negligently or wil-
fully fails to require of them the due conformity to the
40. See, e.g., Tracy v. Cloyd, 10 W. Va. 19, 30 (1877) ("[Supervisors] are not
responsible... unless, indeed, they are guilty of ordinary negligence at least, in not
selecting persons of suitable skill, or in not exercising a reasonable superintendence
and vigilance over their [subordinates'] acts and doings."); Foster v. M.A. Metts &
Co., 55 Miss. 77, 81 (1877) ("[P]ostmasters are not liable for losses occasioned by their
sub-agents, clerks, and servants employed under them, unless they are guilty of
negligence in not selecting persons of suitable skill . . ").
41. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
42. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND
OFFICERS § 789, at 529 (1890) (noting that vicarious liability was rejected for 'obvious
considerations of public policy"). In City of Richmond v. Long's Administrators, 58
Va. (17 Gratt.) 375 (1867), overruled by First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 301
S.E.2d 8, 12 (1983), the court noted that:
[Public] officers are held responsible for their own acts in the abuse or
transgression of their authority, or in default of proper and reasonable care in
the choice of their agents or in the superintendence of them in the discharge of
their allotted duties. But it is now firmly established that the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply to them.
Id. at 378; see also Wiggins v. Hathaway, 6 Barb. 632, 635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849)
(finding the postmaster not liable on a respondeat superior basis but liable for his
own negligence).
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prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or
negligently oversees, conducts or carries on the business
of his office as to furnish the opportunity for the default;
or (4) and a fortiori, where he has directed, authorized or
co-operated in the wrong.43
Today's tort rules for supervisory liability do not differ
significantly from those in force at the turn of the last century.
Vicarious liability is normally not applied;4" rather, most
states require only that superior officers reasonably look after
their subordinates.4" If a trend has emerged over the last
one hundred years, however, it is a greater willingness of
modern courts to absolve superior officials of responsibility.
Hence, several courts have modified the general negligence
standard normally applied, lessening the legal responsibilities
of supervisory officials.46
43. MECHEM, supra note 42, § 790, at 529 (footnotes omitted) (collecting
cases).
44. See, e.g., Boettger v. Moore, 483 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The
traditional rule is that higher city officials are not liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the acts of lower officials because the lower officials are not
the employees of the higher officials; both are fellow servants of the city .... ");
Delaney v. Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351, 1353 (D. Mass. 1976) ("Public officials cannot be
held liable for monetary damages under 1983 purely for an alleged failure to exercise
proper supervisory control over their subordinates."); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1067 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] ("[An officer is ordinarily not liable on the basis of
respondeat superior for the acts of his subordinates.") (citation omitted). But see First
Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 301 S.E.2d 8, 11-13 (Va. 1983) (applying vicarious
liability to superior government officials); County of Monroe v. AFSCME, Council 82,
456 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (App. Div. 1982) (stating that vicarious liability would apply
to a sheriff).
45. Though "an officer is ordinarily not liable on the basis of respondeat
superior for the acts of his subordinates .... he may be liable for his own negligence
in permitting those acts or otherwise." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 132, at
1067 (citations omitted); see also State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599
P.2d 777, 786-87 (Ariz. 1979) (stating that public officials face liability only for their
own wrongdoings or a failure to hire adequate employees), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604,606-07 (Ariz. 1980); Liber v. Flor, 415 P.2d
332, 338 (Colo. 1966); Salem Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitcomb, 362 N.E.2d 1180,
1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (allowing a supervisor to be held liable for misfeasance
or nonfeasance when performing ministerial duties); Smith v. Miller, 40 N.W.2d 597,
598-99 (Iowa 1950) (stating that a sheriff is bound to exercise reasonable care to
protect prisoners); Moores v. Fayette County, 418 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ky. 1967) (noting
that public officials face liability for the negligent selection of employees); Whitney
v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Mass. 1977) (allowing supervisory
liability for misfeasance or nonfeasance when performing ministerial duties);
Reckman v. Keiter, 164 N.E.2d 448, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (noting that a public
official can be held liable for negligent failure to perform a legal duty).
46. See, e.g., De Correvant v. Lohman, 228 N.E.2d 592,594 (111. App. Ct. 1967)
([A] public official is exempt from liability for the unlawful acts of his subordinates
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B. Supervisory Liability Under Section 1983
Because section 1983 proved fairly useless until the Supreme
Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,47 its treatment of
supervisory liability has a relatively short history. Suffice it
to say that although the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the issue, lower courts over the past twenty years
have uniformly (almost unanimously) recognized the potential
for derivative supervisory liability under section 1983.
Beginning in the early 1970s, courts interpreting section
1983 applied a basic negligence standard, one virtually
identical to the common-law counterpart discussed above.48
Under this approach, a superior could be held personally
unless a statute creates liability."); Webber v. Andersen, 187 N.W.2d 290, 294-95
(Neb. 1971) (noting that superiors are liable only where they negligently employ
subordinates or have 'directed or encouraged or ratified such acts, or [have]
personally co-operated therein"); Antonelli v. City of Mt. Vernon, 234 N.Y.S.2d 550,
554 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ("Public officers are not liable for negligence of their subordinates,
unless they cooperate in the acts complained of."); Taylor v. Stanford, 229 S.W.2d
427,429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ("[I]t is an essential ingredient of [supervisory] liability
that the superior officer authorized, participated in, or ratified the individual act of
his subordinate.").
47. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe held that action could be "under color of
state law" for purposes of § 1983 even though the state official acted beyond the scope
of her duties and even if the official contravened state law. Id. at 184-87; see also,
e.g., Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1974). Professor Zagrans, however,
argues that '[a]s a matter of statutory construction Monroe is flatly wrong." Eric H.
Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983
Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 502 (1985). If Professor Zagrans is correct there would
effectively be no supervisory liability under § 1983 because a culpable failure to
supervise would almost always violate state-imposed duties, see supra notes 44-46
and accompanying text, and consequently be "unauthorized." Only supervisory
liability for "direct" violations would survive, see supra notes 25-29 and accompany-
ing text, and even this would be severely compromised.
48. See, e.g., Dewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting the
negligence standard); Beverly v. Morris, 470 F.2d 1356, 1357 (5th Cir. 1972)
(affirming a jury verdict against a police chief who negligently failed to train or
supervise); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 135 (2d Cir.) (applying common-law tort
standard that one is responsible for the natural consequences of his actions), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(applying a negligent breach of duty standard in a § 1983 action), rev'd on other
grounds, District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Roberts v. Williams, 456
F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir.) (noting that a supervisor owes a duty to exercise ordinary
and reasonable care), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). See generally Steven W.
Hansen, Use of the Federal Injunction to Protect Constitutional Rights: Rizzo v.
Goode and the Control of Governmental Bureaucracies, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 231, 243 &
n.59 (1977) ("[I]n numerous cases it was held that a superior's negligent failure to
train or supervise subordinates or to prevent unlawful actions by private parties was
actionable.") (collecting cases).
66 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:1
accountable in damages for the unconstitutional conduct of his
subordinates, but only to the extent that the superior was
negligent in performing his duties.4 9
Today, notwithstanding sporadic protests to the contrary,50
courts are still willing to impose derivative supervisory
liability under section 1983. 5' Courts typically, however,
have foregone the negligence standard52 that traditionally
49. Vicarious liability premised on § 1983 was never regarded as a serious
possibility. Commentators have agreed with this conclusion. See NAHMOD, supra
note 32, § 3.15, at 168 ("There are... sound policy reasons for not applying respon-
deat superior to superior officers in § 1983 cases."); Kerry P. Eagan, The Scope of
Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 141 (1979) (urging
a negligence standard); VINCENT R. FONTANA, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 8.7, at 361 (1990) ("Although Monell dealt only with the liability of
municipalities and not their supervisory employees, the weight of authority now
suggests that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in Section 1983
jurisprudence at all." (citations omitted)). Nevertheless, a few courts have used
vicarious liability where called for by state law. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Carroll, 457
F.2d 968, 969 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1973); Hesselgesser v.
Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 980 (5th
Cir. 1989) (imposing vicarious liability under state law if a supervisor "ratified"
wrongdoing).
50. See, e.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[An
official's mere-and even callous-inaction in the face of subordinate officers'
unconstitutional actions clearly does not suffice to render the official liable for those
actions."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991); Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82, 84-85
(4th Cir. 1989) ("In the first place, there is a serious question of whether these
supervisory officials could be held liable for damages for the acts of their subordi-
nates .... At any rate, we are easily persuaded that, under these circumstances,
these officers are entitled to qualified immunity. . . ."); Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah,
723 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ("A plaintiff must establish that a supervisor
... actually exercised control over the officer in connection with the conduct at issue
(i.e., shooting)."); see also NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.15, at 168, § 3.16, at 171-73
(arguing for limiting supervisory liability to situations where the superior personally
acted unconstitutionally as well as the subordinate).
51. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.
1990); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Miltier v. Beorn, 896
F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990); Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir.
1989); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989); Leach v. Shelby County
Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990);
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988); Gallegos v. State, 758
P.2d 299, 302-03 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987), cert. quashed, 757 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1988).
52. See, e.g., Oliver v. Collins, 904 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that
a claim of negligent supervision failed to state a claim under § 1983); Leach v. Shelby
County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989) ('[A] claim of failure to supervise
or properly train under section 1983 cannot be based on simple negligence."), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989)
(stating that reckless disregard on the part of a supervisor suffices for supervisory
liability and that this "requires more than mere negligence"); Croft v. Harder, 730 F.
Supp. 342, 353 (D. Kan. 1989) (noting that in the Second Circuit a successful "negli-
gent supervision" claim requires a showing of gross negligence), affd, 927 F.2d 1163
(10th Cir. 1991); Shelly v. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ("[A]
claim that supervisory prison officials negligently failed to halt harassment will not
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guided supervisors' actions and have instead adopted a more
tolerant approach premised upon either the superior's "super-
carelessness" or her conscious awareness of the subordinate's
wrongdoing.
To describe what this Article refers to as super-carelessness,
courts have used terminology such as "gross negligence,"
"recklessness," and "deliberate indifference."53 Descriptions
such as these have not been given independent significance,
but instead have been used interchangeably by the courts.54
The gist of all of these terms is that the supervisor was
extremely careless; his actions exhibited "more than mere
negligence yet less than malicious or actual intent."55
stand."), affd, 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988); cf. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671
(11th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that a supervisor need only be put on "notice of the need
to correct the alleged violation" to be held accountable), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2056
(1991); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 825-26 (1st Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J.,
concurring) (urging a standard focusing on the foreseeability of the constitutional
wrong), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1454 (6th Cir. 1990) (deliberate
indifference); Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989)
(reckless or callous indifference); Lopez v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 351,
355 (5th Cir. 1987) (gross negligence, or deliberate or callous indifference); Voutour
v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[A] section 1983 claim based on lack of
proper police training requires, at very least, proof of gross negligence both as to the
Police Chief and the Town."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Murray v. Koehler,
734 F. Supp. 605, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (gross negligence); DeBow v. City of E. St.
Louis, 510 N.E.2d 895, 904 (Ill. App. Ct.) (recklessness), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d
100, 105 (ll. 1987); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 431 (Me.
1987) (recklessness or deliberate indifference); Gallegos v. State, 758 P.2d 299, 303
(N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (deliberate indifference), cert. quashed, 757 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1988).
54. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989)
("[S]upervisory liability may be imposed when an official has actual or constructive
notice of unconstitutional practices and demonstrates 'gross negligence' or 'deliberate
indifference' by failing to act."); Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137-38 (8th Cir.
1989) (deliberate indifference or reckless disregard); Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d
1151, 1163 (1st Cir.) (reckless or callous indifference), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 75
(1989); Dobos v. Driscoll, 537 N.E.2d 558, 569-70 (Mass.) (equating gross negligence
with deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 149 (1989).
After the Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), some
lower courts have begun to recognize that gross negligence, recklessness, and
deliberate indifference are selective degrees of culpability with independent signifi-
cance. See, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362, 366 n.4 (9th Cir.
1990) (discussing distinctions between various levels of mens rea), affd in part, rev'd
in part en banc, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3520 (1992).
In municipal liability cases, these distinctions are important because a city is only
responsible for its "deliberate indifference" in failing to train its employees. Harris,
489 U.S. at 388. "Gross negligence" and "recklessness" are not enough. See Mark R.
Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 653. But in regard to supervisory liability no distinctions
between these levels of culpability have yet been drawn.
55. Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 138 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing the definition
of reckless disregard given in Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984)).
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Though super-carelessness appears to form the rule, a
substantial minority of courts have required an even higher
level of mens rea based on conscious wrongdoing. These courts
speak in terms of the supervisor's "knowledge," "acquiescence,"
or "implicit authorization."" Apparently, though not overly
clear from the opinions, this standard results in a superior's
liability only if she was aware of the subordinate's activity.
Though the superior need not direct or encourage the subordi-
nate's unconstitutional activity, she must antecedently (or at
least contemporaneously) 57 be aware of it. 5"
56. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[T]here must be some affirmative conduct by the supervisor .... [This] can
be shown in two ways, either 'through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence,' or through proof of direct discrimination by the
supervisor." (citations omitted)); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)
("A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the
supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and
failed to act to prevent them."); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246
(6th Cir. 1989) (noting that there must be at least "implicit authorization" or "know-
ing acquiescence"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990); Moy v. Gold, 735 F. Supp.
279, 283 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("personal knowledge"); Kreutzer v. County of San Diego, 200
Cal. Rptr. 322, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("general knowledge" required); Lloyd v.
Hines, 474 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("actual knowledge" sufficient).
57. The majority of courts requiring awareness speak of the superior having
the ability to prevent the constitutional harm by the subordinate. See, e.g., Taylor v.
List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that a "supervisor is only liable...
if the supervisor.., knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them"). This
necessarily implies that knowledge be at least contemporaneous with the unconstitu-
tional activity. At least one circuit has taken a different approach, focusing on
knowledge, yet finding subsequent knowledge sufficient for liability when the same
type of violation or condition continues unremedied. See Pool v. Missouri Dep't of
Corrections & Human Resources, 883 F.2d 640, 645 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[A] plaintiff
must show that a superior had actual knowledge that his subordinates caused
deprivations of constitutional rights and that he demonstrated deliberate indifference
or 'tacit authorization' of the offensive acts by failing to take steps to remedy them.").
The Pool court's approach, allowing subsequent awareness to lead to liability, appears
more like a carelessness standard than one based on actual awareness.
58. See, e.g., Jones v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1989) ("At a
minimum, a ... plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending subordinate." (citing Alioto v. City of Shively, 835 F.2d 1173, 1175 (6th Cir.
1987))); Delaney v. Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351, 1354 (D. Mass. 1976) ("[Tlhere must be
an allegation of, at least, some participation or acquiescence-express or other-
wise-in the constitutional deprivations complained of.").
Several courts speak of supervisory liability where the supervisor was present
when the constitutional wrong took place. Presence and acquiescence should thus
prove sufficient for liability. See, e.g., Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972)
(finding assault in the presence of a supervisor sufficient for supervisory liability);
Anderson v. City of N.Y., 657 F. Supp. 1571, 1580-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (involving
supervisory presence and failure to intercede); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F.
Supp. 1401, 1415 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (same), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.
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Whether using a super-carelessness formula or one depen-
dent upon the superior's awareness of wrongdoing, courts
interpreting section 1983 have agreed that supervisory
liability may attach for omissions as well as actions. 59 To
this extent section 1983 has proven consistent with the
traditional state law analogue. It really could be no other
way, because supervisory inaction forms the classical model
for supervisory liability. Though courts often speak of "wrong-
ful conduct" on behalf of the supervisor,6" or the supervisor's
personal involvement,6 ' invariably they are alluding to
supervisory inaction. Cases rarely arise where the plaintiff
attempts to establish that a supervisor affirmatively acted to
cause a constitutional violation.62  Instead, the plaintiff
almost universally claims that the supervisor failed to properly
train, instruct or otherwise supervise his subordinates.
In any omission case, of course, the principal question is
one of duty. Courts thus typically begin their analysis by
searching for a duty on the supervisor's part to train or
instruct the wayward subordinate.6 3  And in this process,
1984). These cases appear consistent with the requirement of actual awareness. In
Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974), the court explained: "The mere fact
of presence of a superior officer would not be sufficient to impose liability .... Yet
presence is evidentiary on the facts of actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the
unlawful acts of the subordinates." Id. at 570-71.
59. See, e.g., Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989) ("Supervi-
sors, in addition to being liable for their own actions, are liable when their corrective
inaction amounts to 'deliberate indifference' to or 'tacit authorization' of the violative
practices."); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A supervisor is...
liable ... if the supervisor ... knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent
them."); Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1048 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[S]upervisory
liability may be imposed when an official has actual or constructive notice of
unconstitutional practices and demonstrates 'gross negligence' or 'deliberate
indifference' by failing to act."); Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947,953 (1st Cir.
1989) (noting that supervisors could be found liable if they "could have prevented the
challenged act"); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that
allegations of gross negligence in failing to provide proper police training could state
a claim under § 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986). But see Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting supervisory inaction as a
basis of liability for police officers), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991).
60. E.g., Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989).
61. E.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988).
62. When cases predicated upon a supervisor's wrongful action arise, they
normally involve either the supervisor's personal violation of the Constitution, or his
complicity in a constitutional violation. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text.
63. See, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362, 364 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 if"he omits to perform an act
which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation"), affd in part, rev'd in
part en banc, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3520 (1992);
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courts, predominantly federal courts, have experienced little
difficulty locating supervisory duties. With little dissent,64
courts have looked to state and local law for the requisite
duty.65
Even though courts have been willing to use state law duties
to support section 1983 liability, they have refused to incorpo-
rate these duties verbatim. Courts have tended to disregard
state law to the extent that it imposes negligence (or vicarious
liability) as the standard for supervisory care.66 Instead,
super-carelessness has supplanted whatever level of fault is
prescribed by the state law duty.67 A hybrid supervisory
duty results, where state law supplies the impetus to act but
federal law defines the degree of expected care.
Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The defendant must omit
to perform an act which he is legally required to do which causes the deprivation of
the plaintiffs federally protected rights."); Cochran v. Rowe, 438 F. Supp. 566, 573
(N.D. Ill. 1977) ("It is clear that where the defendant is under an affirmative duty to
act and fails to act, he may be held liable for the consequences under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.").
64. See, e.g., Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1986)
(identifying analytical confusion that may arise in § 1983 litigation when courts look
to state law in locating supervisory duty) (discussed infra note 168); Coon v.
Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the use of state law duties
for § 1983 liability).
65. See, e.g., Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1186-87 (7th Cir. 1989)
(looking to statutory obligations for vicarious liability of supervisor), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2167 (1990); Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Crooks
v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080,
1087 (1lth Cir. 1986) (noting that a "violation of a duty imposed by state law result-
ing in constitutional injury will establish a causal connection sufficient to trigger
supervisory liability"); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 821 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting
that a supervisor's violation of state law may be treated as evidence of gross
negligence), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206,
1209 (5th Cir.) ("[N]o defendant can be held liable unless it is shown that he breached
some duty imposed by state law, and that the breach had some causal connection
with the constitutional deprivation."), vacated in part, 728 F.2d 712, 713 (1984);
McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968, 969 (6th Cir. 1972) (referring to state law to hold
a supervisor vicariously liable for punitive damages), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106
(1973); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) (noting duties created by state
law), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 903 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("We think the Civil Rights Act does authorize the application, under
appropriate circumstances, of state laws pertaining to vicarious liability and liability
created by statute.").
66. See supra notes 52-58 (collecting cases).
67. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. Some courts have
completely applied state law, even where the state law is one of vicarious liability.
But this is the exception and not the rule. See supra note 49.
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II. DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS WITH DERIVATIVE LIABILITY
The model for section 1983 supervisory liability that has
emerged in the lower courts can be faulted for a number of
reasons, some doctrinal and others more philosophical. Two
doctrinal problems that deserve discussion are: first, whether
section 1983 is available at all to remedy supervisory omis-
sions; and second, assuming section 1983 is accessible,
whether federal courts are always competent to furnish relief.
Although the first hurdle can be overcome easily, the second
proves troublesome.
A. Section 1983 Liability for Supervisory Omissions
It appears today that vicarious supervisory liability falls
beyond the ambit of section 1983.68 Though the Supreme
Court has not specifically addressed the issue, it has on two
occasions alluded to the fact that this form of liability cannot
be sustained under section 1983.69 Consequently, supervisors
cannot be held strictly liable for not preventing the constitu-
tional wrongs of their subordinates.
In Rizzo v. Goode,v° decided at a time when local govern-
ments were immune from section 1983 liability, the Court held
that injunctive relief could not be granted against a
municipality's supervisory officials who did not participate in
68. See NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.15, at 166-68.
69. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 363 (1976). Professor Nahmod explains:
Monell ... demonstrates convincingly that respondeat superior cannot be
applied either to superiors or to local government entities .... [R]espondeat
superior, according to the Court, cannot be used against local government
entities because § 1983's language requires a causal relation between the
conduct of the person and the plaintiffs constitutional deprivation .... More
to the point, the Court also indicated rather clearly what an earlier § 1983
decision, Rizzo v. Goode, had only hinted: this same personal involvement and
causal relation are necessary where the person is an individual.
NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.15, at 167-68 (citations omitted).
70. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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the unconstitutional activity of subordinates. 71  Rather, to
secure equitable relief against supervisory officials an "affir-
mative link" must be established between the officials and the
wrong.72 Though the Court did not elaborate on what kind of
participation or "affirmative link" was necessary, it rejected the
supervisor-subordinate relationship alone as insufficient.73
More recently, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,v4
the Court rejected outright respondeat superior as a basis for
municipal liability under section 1983. 7  In doing so the Court
interpreted section 1983's causation requirement to be inconsis-
tent with the concept of vicarious liability.76 Though not
beyond doubt, this same causation requirement likely operates
to defeat vicarious liability for supervisory personnel as well.
Professor Nahmod, noting the Court's reliance on the causation
language of section 1983, has reached just such a conclusion,
stating that Monell "demonstrates convincingly that respondeat
superior cannot be applied either to superiors or to local
government entities."77
Although Monell and Rizzo preclude vicarious responsibility
under section 1983, they do not mean that a supervisor
71. Id. at 377-80. Rizzo arose at a time when local government was not
considered a person for purposes of § 1983. Instead, the Court was operating under
the assumption that federal actions against local government raised serious federal-
ism concerns. See id.; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961). Two years after
Rizzo, the Court held that municipalities were liable under § 1983, and dispelled
most of these fears. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978). See generally Hansen, supra note 48, at 241-42. Rizzo's primary concern was
protection of local government from § 1983 litigation, and not protection of individual
officers. 423 U.S. at 378-79. Rizzo thus arguably left open the potential for vicarious
liability where the damage award ran directly against a municipal official acting in
his individual capacity. In any event, following Monell it appears clear that the
Court will not allow any form of vicarious liability under § 1983. See Monell, 436
U.S. at 691-92; FONTANA, supra note 49, § 8.7, at 361; NAHMOD, supra note 32,
§ 3.15, at 168.
72. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371.
73. Id.
74. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
75. Id. at 691.
76. Id. at 692. Section 1983 expressly provides that a person is liable only
if she "subjects, or causes [another] to be subjected" to a constitutional (or other
federal) violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
77. NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.15, at 167-68. Moreover, in a footnote to the
Monell opinion the Court stated: "By our decision in Rizzo ... we would appear to
have decided that the mere right to control without any control or direction having
been exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983
liability." 436 U.S. at 694 n.58.
Accountability and Section 1983
inaction can never result in that supervisor's being held
personally accountable. In City of Canton v. Harris," the
Court held that a municipality's inaction may lead to
section 1983 liability.79 If passive liability is not precluded
for municipalities, it certainly cannot be foreclosed for
supervisors. Indeed, individual liability under section 1983
has not caused the Court anywhere near the consternation
posed by institutional liability. Thus, Harris's recognition
of passive institutional liability indicates that supervisors
too should be held accountable under section 1983 for
omissive behavior.
Harris, however, cannot be read to dictate the terms of
omissive liability for supervisors. Although some courts have
extrapolated from Harris and argued that supervisors' omis-
sions are actionable to the same extent as municipalities', 0
such rote extension of Harris is both unprincipled and unwar-
ranted. Harris was an abstract institutional liability case
conceived as a compromise to address institutional problems.
The Court's rejection in Monell of respondeat superior left it
with a serious problem of developing an alternative algorithm
for addressing institutional liability. Harris attempted to fill
this void.
Because Harris was born of Monell's rejection of respondeat
superior, understanding Harris requires understanding
Monell. Monell rejected respondeat superior because the Court
believed that the Forty-second Congress rejected it. Interpret-
ing the legislative history behind section 1983, the Court in
Monell concluded that the framers of section 1983 were con-
cerned with their constitutional authority to subject local gov-
ernment to vicarious liability, either for the wrongs of private
78. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
79. The Court held that a municipality's inadequate police training could be
actionable under § 1983 "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id. at
388.
80. See, e.g., Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1454 (6th Cir. 1990) (relying
on Harris to support the viability of a supervisory liability claim); Wilks v. Young,
897 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that "[a]s recently as last year, the Supreme
Court [in Harris] acknowledged that supervisory officials may be liable for
constitutional deprivations, even in circumstances where the official was not directly
involved in the deprivation itself").
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citizens8' or public servants.8 2 To do so might require that
local government create a police force or otherwise redirect
limited public resources.8 3 According to the Court, many
members of the Forty-second Congress felt that the constitu-
tional division of power between national and state govern-
ment did not allow such a federal commandeering of local
resources.8
4
With these concerns in mind, the Court in Monell fashioned
a compromise, one it felt would adequately allay fears grounded
in fiscal federalism. It concluded that local government could
be held accountable, but only for its own wrongs, not those
practiced by others.8 In any case, though the logic of Monell
is somewhat shaky, 6 at least one facet of the opinion is clear.
81. Prior to passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act, Senator Sherman of Ohio
proposed an amendment that would have effectively made towns and counties
responsible for the wrongs of citizens who "riotously and tumultuously assembled
together." See Monell, 436 U.S. at 664; Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV.
517, 524 (1987). The amendment was rejected, however, and this rejection subse-
quently was interpreted by the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), to
mean that the Congress wholly rejected municipal liability. Id. at 188-91. Monell
returned once again to the rejection of Sherman's proposal, but found it not to
preclude completely municipal liability. Instead, the Court in Monell found that the
Forty-second Congress's rejection of the Sherman Amendment was motivated by a
general concern over federal authority to compel local government to "keep the peace"
when they were not so obligated by state law. Monell, 436 U.S. at 668. The fear was
that the Sherman Amendment might force cities into a "Hobson's choice" of either
creating police forces or paying damages for its citizens' wrongs. Id. at 673, 679.
Some in the Forty-second Congress doubted whether the federal government
possessed constitutional authority to impose such a burden on local government. Id.
at 679. Unlike Monroe, however, Monell interpreted this rejection of a general duty
to keep the peace not to foreclose the possibility of a municipality's liability for its
own wrongs, as opposed to the wrongs of its private citizens. Id. at 669. For support
the Court turned to the Dictionary Act, passed shortly before the Ku Klux Klan Act,
that defined "person" to include "bodies politic and corporate." Id. at 688. The
Monell Court thus concluded that "the 'plain meaning 'of§ 1 is that local government
bodies were to be included within the ambit of the persons who could be sued under
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 688-89; see also George D. Brown, Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983 and the Ambiguities of Burger Court Federalism: A
Comment on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle and Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati-The
"Official Policy" Cases, 27 B.C. L. REV. 883, 889 (1986).
82. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693 ("Equally important, creation of a federal law of
respondeat superior would have raised all the constitutional problems associated with
the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not to impose because
it thought imposition of such an obligation unconstitutional."). See generally id. at
691-93 & n.57.
83. Id. at 673.
84. Id. at 673, 679-80.
85. Id. at 691-92.
86. Several commentators, and Justice Stevens, have argued that Monell's
rejection of respondeat superior was unfounded. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471
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Fiscal federalism played a principal role in forging the modern
model of municipal liability. 7 Because Harris derives from
Monell, it too is a fruit of this federalism.88
These same federalism concerns could not have influenced
what the Forty-second Congress thought about supervisory
liability. Holding a government official personally liable for
damages does not have the same constitutional repercussions
as directing that government pay for the wrongs of others. In
1871, as today, there was no suggestion that individual
officers enjoyed the protection of sovereign immunity, let alone
the Eleventh Amendment. 9 Hence, the Forty-second Con-
gress could not have seriously questioned its authority to
impose personal liability on government supervisors. Whether
the Forty-second Congress intended to allow for derivative
supervisory liability, and what standards should be imposed,
are additional questions. But certainly no principled reading
of Monell-and consequently Harris-can support a blind
extension of the rules surrounding municipal liability to
supervisors.9" Though the logic of Harris suggests that
supervisors can be held liable for omissions, Harris cannot be
used to supply the appropriate standards for when such
liability should attach.
Rizzo's impact on supervisory liability is more difficult to
assess, partly because of its oblique language91 and partly
U.S. 808, 839 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); SCHUCK, supra note 19, at 120; Mead,
supra note 81, at 532-46; Charles A. Rothfield, Note, Section 1983 Municipal
Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 938 (1979).
87. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism
Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539,
542 (1989) ("Monell's policy or custom requirement strikes a fundamental balance
between (1) making municipalities accountable in federal court for their constitu-
tional violations and (2) accommodating federalism concerns ...
88. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 392.
89. See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358,364 (1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment
does not erect a barrier against suits to impose 'individual and personal liability' on
state officials under § 1983."); see also infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
90. See Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 1988)
("Because personal-capacity suits are really suits against the official as an individual,
not against the government entity, Monell is always inapplicable."); Moy v. Gold, 735
F. Supp. 279, 283 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (refusing to extend Harris to the supervisory
liability context).
91. The Court in Rizzo addressed three separate issues, any one of which
would appear sufficient to defeat the cause of action. First, the Court expressed
'serious doubts" as to whether the plaintiffs possessed Article III standing to pursue
the case because of the lack of any connection between their alleged injuries and the
defendants' actions. 423 U.S. at 371-73. Second, the Court found no § 1983 claim
because of the absence of any "affirmative link" between the defendants and the
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because of the historical context in which it arose. 92  Com-
mentators in the immediate aftermath of Rizzo pessimistically
concluded, for example, that Rizzo required "active supervisory
encouragement" before section 1983 liability could attach.93
Courts, however, proved more charitable. They tended to
casually cite Rizzo to mean the opposite; rather than preclud-
ing the use of passive behavior to support supervisory liability
under section 1983, Rizzo was found to support it.94
Regardless of citations to the contrary, Rizzo cannot be
relied on to support the use of supervisory omissions as a basis
harm. Id. at 376-77. Finally, the Court found that federalism concerns prohibited
a federal court from intruding into the internal affairs of local government by
granting injunctive relief. Id. at 379-80. This three-prong attack makes reading
Rizzo to mean much of anything extremely difficult. Before closing on any given
point the Court in Rizzo simply moved on to the next argument. It is thus difficult
to discern which part of the discussion is of principal importance, or whether all three
parts are essential to the holding. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 238, 241 & n.19 (1976) (observing that the Court's reliance on standing was
"deliberately ambiguous" in light of its resolving the merits under § 1983); Larry M.
Goodall, Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 62 VA. L.
REV. 1259, 1262 (1976) (noting that after resolving the standing issue, "the Court
inexplicably plunged into the merits of the case").
92. Rizzo arose while Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), was still good law.
Monroe held that local government could not be sued under § 1983. 365 U.S. at
187-91. Although Monroe's major impact was on governmental liability in damages,
it also technically precluded even equitable actions under § 1983 against local govern-
ment. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973), overruled by Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Litigants therefore often brought
equitable actions nominally against supervisory officials knowing that the relief
would actually operate against the local governmental unit. Eric Schnapper, Civil
Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 214 (1979). Today, of course,
it is recognized that an equitable action against a government official in his offi-
cial-as opposed to individual-capacity is in reality one against the government. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
471-73 (1985) (clarifying that a § 1983 action against a public servant in his official
capacity imposes liability on the public entity he represents).
93. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 91, at 243; see also Goodall,
supra note 91, at 1271 ("Apparently even a showing that police officials deliberately
acquiesced in the misconduct of their subordinates will not establish Section 1983
liability under Rizzo."); Note, Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against Police
Abuse: Picking Up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode, 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 530, 556-57
(1976) ("The crucial question [after Rizzo] is whether the term ['causes' found in
§ 1983] comprehends those situations in which the constitutional deprivations occur
as a result of passive official toleration or the indifferent management of an institu-
tion inherently productive of violations.").
94. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 569 (1st Cir.
1989); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812,820 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100
(1986); Gallegos v. State, 758 P.2d 299, 304 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). But see Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991);
Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 569 A.2d 872, 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989).
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of liability under section 1983. The majority in Rizzo specifi-
cally warned against equating governmental failures and ac-
tions.9" Moreover, the dissent in Rizzo read the majority
opinion to preclude section 1983 liability based on anything
less than an official's "directions."96 Reading Rizzo to support
liability premised on passive conduct, whether individual or
institutional, thus appears nothing less than fanciful.
Like Monell and Harris, Rizzo does not provide answers to
questions concerning the precise limits of supervisory liability.
The plaintiffs in Rizzo were operating under the strictures of
Monroe v. Pape," the Court's seventeen-year false start that
precluded governmental responsibility under section 1983.
The lawsuit filed in Rizzo, though naming supervisory
personnel as defendants, was in reality an equitable action
against the City of Philadelphia.98 As with Monell and
Harris, Rizzo was an institutional case. Supervisors were
named defendants only because the plaintiffs could not sue the
City of Philadelphia directly.99
More importantly, the Court's federalism discussion in Rizzo
demonstrates that not only was it prosecuted as an institu-
tional case, it was decided as one. 1' As demonstrated
95. 423 U.S. at 375-76; see also Brown, 922 F.2d at 1120 (citing Rizzo as a
bar to supervisory liability for inaction).
96. 423 U.S. at 384 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court today appears to
assert that a state official is not subject to the strictures of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless
he directs the deprivation of constitutional rights.").
97. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe's preclusion of municipal liability under
§ 1983 was overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
664-91 (1978).
98. See 423 U.S. at 371. The officers named in the original complaints filed
in Rizzo were sued in their official capacities. See id. at 365 n.1 ("Both complaints
named as defendants those officials then occupying the offices of Mayor, City
Managing Director... and the Police Commissioner.. . .") (emphasis added). Any
relief ordered in the case would have operated against the city through the officials
who were currently holding office. See supra note 92.
99. See Schnapper, supra note 92, at 237 ('In light of Monell it appears that
the outcome of Rizzo resulted in part from the fact that, under Monroe, only the
mayor but not the city of Philadelphia was then an available defendant."); Susan
Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels, and Davidson: Distinguishing a Custom or Policy
from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 101, 153 (1986) ("Rizzo did not
fully discuss a municipality's liability for its customs because Rizzo was decided
before Monell.").
100. See 423 U.S. at 378-80. Professor Fallon has observed that Rizzo was a
difficult case because a federal court was asked to supervise a local police department:
[Tihe demands on its practical competence would have been formidable.... The
district court would have needed to demonstrate managerial insight, if not
criminological expertise.... [Moreover], [t]he functions undertaken also would
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above, the policies molding institutional decisions like Monell
and Rizzo are fundamentally different from those that shape
the rules of individual liability. 1 ' Hence, whatever the
exact meaning of Rizzo, °2 it cannot have any serious appli-
cation in the context of supervisory liability. It simply fails to
address the question.' °3
B. A Fresh Inquiry into Passive Supervisory Liability
The most appropriate starting point for assessing the merit
of an argument in favor of passive supervisory liability is the
language of section 1983. Section 1983 requires that before a
person can be held liable she must "subject[], or cause[]
[another] to be subjected" to a constitutional deprivation. 0 4
Of course, it can be argued (as in Rizzo) that this language
requires affirmative conduct for liability to attach; only
actions, not omissions, cause results.
Tort law, however, has traditionally recognized that omissions
too cause results, at least under certain circumstances.0 '
have possessed a legislative dimension. Had its ruling effectively mandated
additional expenditures on police matters, a federal court would have intruded
into allocational issues traditionally left to legislative decisionmakers.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1984).
101. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
102. Following Monell's revitalization of municipal liability, Rizzo appears left
as a fairly unremarkable standing case-a precursor to City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the Court held that although a person whose constitu-
tional rights are violated might be able to obtain damages under § 1983, he still
might not have standing to obtain injunctive relief. Id. at 105. For a constitutional
tort plaintiff to have Article III standing to obtain injunctive relief, he must
.establish a real and immediate threat that he would again" experience the same type
of constitutional tort. Id. Lyons has been severely criticized as being an undue
extension of Rizzo. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 110, 117
(1985) (casting Lyons as "anomalous," "extreme and unprecedented"); Fallon, supra
note 100, at 38 (arguing that Rizzo did not compel the conclusion reached in Lyons);
The Supreme Court-1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 219 (1983) (noting that Lyons
was a "marked extension of the restrictive principles of standing").
103. See Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989)
("The Supreme Court [in Rizzo] left open the question of whether a supervisor could
be liable for inaction where he or she knew or should have known of widespread
violations by subordinates."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
105. See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 56, at 373-85
(describing circumstances and collecting cases).
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Distinctions between affirmative action (misfeasance) and
passive conduct (nonfeasance) have, of course, proved a hall-
mark of the common law. Only the former is generally action-
able. For the latter to give rise to a cause of action, some
special relationship must exist between the victim and the
wrongdoer, or the circumstances of the case must otherwise
give rise to a duty or obligation to act.l' Once that duty
arises, however, tort law recognizes that omissions can and do
cause injury.
10 7
Because of the absence of persuasive legislative history to
the contrary, 0 8 section 1983 should be read consistently
106. Traditionally, one only has a duty to act if he bears a special relationship
to the victim, e.g., husband-wife, or to the tortfeasor, e.g., parent-child, or where one
has a contractual duty to act, has gratuitously assumed a duty of care, has a
statutory duty to act, or in some way has placed the victim in a perilous situation.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3(a), at 203-04,
206 (2d ed. 1986). An omission can give rise to criminal liability whenever there is
a duty to act. See id. § 3.3(a), at 203. Likewise, under tort law one can be held
responsible for an omission where there is a duty to act. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 44, § 56, at 373-74. The duties are much the same in criminal and tort
law. See generally Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Affirmative Duty and Constitu-
tional Tort, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1982) (considering the scope of government
officers' affirmative duties).
107. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 41, at 265 ("The failure to fence
a railway track may be a cause, and an important one, that a child is struck by a
train. It is familiar law that if such omissions are culpable they will result in lia-
bility." (citation omitted)).
Criminal law has developed along the same lines. It is assumed that one who
breaches a duty owed to another is criminally responsible for the harm that might
have been avoided. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 106, § 3.3(d), at 209-10. If a
child is drowning in a lake and a bystander fails to jump into the water to save her,
saying that the bystander caused the child's death is indeed troublesome. There are
simply too many events other than the omission that appear more proximately
related to the death. If the bystander is the child's father, however, the combination
of his passively allowing the child to drown and the duty imposed on him by law lead
to the conclusion that the father is the "legal cause" of the child's death. See JEROME
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 196 (2d ed. 1960). See generally
Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958).
108. The legislative history behind § 1983 on this point is at best ambiguous.
See Jay I. Sabin, Note, Clio and the Court Redux: Toward a Dynamic Mode of
Interpreting Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
369, 384 (1990) ("[Tlhe very problem with section 1983 is the fact that the Forty-
second Congress did not pay much attention to it. Thus, for the most part, almost
any historical interpretation of it is at best inconclusive." (citation omitted)).
Nonetheless, the legislative history behind § 1983 more likely supports passive
liability. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651,674, 700-05 (1979) (arguing that congressional intent
following the Civil War was to force states to provide protection, not necessarily only
to prohibit state action). The history cited by the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), certainly supports liability for omissions. In addressing the third "aim"
behind § 1983, that is, "to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
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with these common-law principles.' s Congress was pre-
sumptively aware of the fundamental principles of tort law
when it enacted section 1983.110 Without any conclusive
proof to the contrary, reasoning that section 1983 was in-
tended to be treated in a similar fashion makes perfect sense.
Thus, as with tort and criminal law, the focus under section
1983 should shift from causation to duty.
As for duty, history demonstrates that government officials
for the last two hundred years have been obligated in one way
or another to supervise subordinates."' Given that the law
in 1871 commonly held superiors to a duty to supervise
subordinates-again, a fact of which the Forty-second Con-
gress was presumptively aware-one is hard-pressed to argue
that section 1983 precludes passive supervisory liability.
Instead, the conclusion that Congress meant for passive
liability to be at least a possibility under section 1983 seems
unassailable.
adequate in theory, was not available in practice," id. at 173-74 (1961), the Court
quoted at length statements made by supporters and opponents of the bill which was
to become § 1983. These quotations included several references to remedying passive
official conduct, that is, to force state officials to act and to hold them responsible for
their omissions. Id. at 175. For instance, the Court found one of the major concerns
of the Forty-second Congress was states' inability or unwillingness to enforce state
law when dealing with the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 174-75. The Court noted that
"[there was available to the Congress during these debates a report... dealing with
the activities of the Klan and the inability of the state governments to cope with it."
Id. at 174. The Court continued, explaining that the bill's momentum came "not
[from] the unavailability of state remedies but [from] the failure of certain States to
enforce the laws. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court observed: "While
one main scourge of the evil-perhaps the leading one-was the Ku Klux Klan, the
remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but against those who
representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state
law." Id. at 175-76 (citation omitted). If Monroe accurately reflects the intent behind
§ 1983, contrary to the view of Professor Zagrans, see Zagrans, supra note 47, at 502,
there can be little doubt that the Forty-second Congress was aware of and intended
§ 1983 to address official omissions.
109. See City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 838 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[Wie have repeatedly held that § 1983 should be construed to
incorporate common-law doctrine 'absent specific provisions to the contrary.' We have
consistently applied this principle of construction to federal legislation enacted in the
19th Century." (citation omitted)); cf Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
637-38 (1980) (holding that common-law immunity doctrines are preserved by
§ 1983).
110. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 837-38 (Stevens, J., dissentingi ("[I]t 'is always
appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the
law' [when passing legislation]." (citations omitted)).
111. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
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C. State Law as a Source of Duties
Recognizing that the Forty-second Congress was familiar
with liability for passive conduct does not end the inquiry.
The question of the proper standard of care remains. Parcel
to this issue is where to search for the appropriate standard.
Should the search be of federal or state law?
Because the focus of this Article is derivative supervisory
liability, I will assume at this juncture that no specific federal
duty arises under either statute or the Constitution, 112 at
least none that is generated independently of section
1983.13 The question then is whether to choose state law to
supply supervisory duties, or to use section 1983 itself to
create a more general federal obligation. Lower courts to date
have unfortunately avoided using section 1983 as a source of
duty, and have instead generally opted for state law."4
Jurisdictional problems naturally develop when state law is
relied upon to support a federal action in federal court." 5
In the classical supervisory liability case, the court (nor-
mally a federal court" 6 ) will observe that supervisors can be
112. Where an affirmative duty to act is created by the Federal Constitution
(or some other federal law) no peculiar problems arise. The terms of the debate
simply focus on the substantive federal law. If the Constitution says one must act,
then § 1983 obviously provides a remedy for breach of that duty. For example, the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments have been interpreted to require that prison
officials provide needed medical assistance to inmates. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). If a prison official is deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of an inmate the prison official can be held directly responsible under
§ 1983 for his failures. See id. at 105; see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text.
113. Breach of a specific federal duty would itself be sufficient to support a
§ 1983 cause of action. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (interpreting
§ 1983 to cover violations of federal statutory and constitutional law). Note that this
is different from § 1983 supplying the duty. Should § 1983 be interpreted as creating
a duty to supervise, some other substantive right would also need to be violated for
a cause of action to arise. In this sense, using § 1983 to generate a duty to supervise
would still result in derivative liability. See infra notes 196-212 and accompanying
text.
114. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 122-95 and accompanying text. Recognition of the
ostensibly remedial nature of § 1983 is perhaps the cause of this search of state law.
See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text; infra notes 198-200 and accompanying
text.
116. Even though state courts can entertain § 1983 claims-indeed, they are
required to hear them, see Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 2439-40 (1990) ("A state
court may not deny a federal right, when ... properly before it, in the absence of a
'valid excuse.' )--section 1983 plaintiffs more often choose federal courts to vindicate
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held derivatively liable under section 1983 for the constitu-
tional violations of subordinates. "But," the court will say,
"only if there exists a duty." The court then marches off into
the vagaries of state statutes and decisions in search of a
supervisory obligation. Although courts sometimes are silent
as to the exact source of the duty they find," 7 more often
than not the duty is found only by canvassing state law.
118
Few federal courts have yet ventured an opinion as to the
propriety of exploring state law for substantive duties." 9
Instead, they readily accept the task, apparently as a condi-
ment of section 1983. And, indeed, it may be--but that itself
their rights against supervisory personnel. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 1-1, 1-2 (1988) ("Litigants seeking affirmative relief
under federal law in cases against state or local governments and their officials
generally prefer federal courts . . . . "). A search of reported state court decisions
addressing the question of supervisory liability under § 1983 revealed only twelve
cases. See Oliver v. Townsend, 534 So. 2d 1038, 1043-44 (Ala. 1988); Kreutzer v.
County of San Diego, 200 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Lloyd v.
Hines, 474 So. 2d 376, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Daniel v. Village of Hoffman
Estates, 520 N.E.2d 754, 756-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1242
(Ill. 1988); DeBow v. City of E. St. Louis, 510 N.E.2d 895, 905-06 (Ill. App. Ct.),
appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. 1987); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst.,
535 A.2d 421, 431-32 (Me. 1987); Will v. Department of Civil Servs., 377 N.W.2d 826,
831 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), affd in part, rev'd in part, 410 N.W.2d 749 (Mich. 1987),
affd sub noma. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Delbridge
v. Schaeffer, 569 A.2d 872, 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989); Hem v. Crist, 735
P.2d 1151, 1155 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 735 P.2d 1150 (N.M. 1987); Gallegos v.
State, 758 P.2d 299, 303-04 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Kinney v. Ohio Dep't of Admin.
Servs., 507 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Saenz v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 780,
785 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 469 N.W.2d 611 (Wis. 1991). An identical search of
federal court decisions unearthed close to one hundred reported decisions specifically
addressing supervisory liability under § 1983.
117. For instance, in McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga.
1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984), the police unlawfully used a
chokehold on a suspect, resulting in the suspect's death. His widow brought suit not
only against the officers at the scene who applied the chokehold, but also against
their superiors. The court found the superiors equally responsible for the constitu-
tional violation because they "had a duty to intervene in the excessive use of force
against [the victim] and failed to do so." 572 F. Supp. at 1416. Not a word was
mentioned as to the source of that duty.
118. In Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986), for example, the
court concluded that "violation of a duty imposed by state law resulting in
constitutional injury will establish a causal connection sufficient to trigger supervi-
sory liability." Id. at 1087 (citing Barksdale v. King, 699 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir.
1983)); see also Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding a duty in
a state statute); Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1989) (same).
119. But see McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing rules
surrounding Erie and pendent jurisdiction as support), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106
(1973); Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1971) (relying on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988).
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is a separate, complex question, one addressed below. 120 For
the moment, assume that section 1983 is wholly silent about
duty and where it might be located.' 2 '
Given this supposition, federal courts may not possess
authority to conduct such an inquiry. The specific question is
whether a federal court can use state law duties to attribute
liability under section 1983 from one government official to
another. Stated more generally, the issue is whether a federal
court can entertain a state claim against a supervisory official
not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction when that claim
is closely related to a federal claim against a supervised state
agent.
1. Pendent-party jurisdiction-Because the Supreme
Court has occasionally endorsed federal perusals of state law
to aid resolution of a federal question,'22 a single answer to
this question might not be possible. It may depend on how the
federal court is using state law. Consider two cases, one
arising in State A and the other in State B. In each, assume
a police officer uses excessive force against a suspect and
thereby violates the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights.'23
Both suspects wish to sue in federal court and join the
offending officer's immediate supervisor, the chief of police.
Assume State A's law provides that the chief of police is
unconditionally responsible for the wrongs of his subordinates.
In other words, assume the law of State A affords strict,
vicarious liability against the chief of police. 24 Assume the
120. See infra notes 196-212 and accompanying text.
121. Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that state law
might sometimes be used to supplement § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). This use
of § 1988 is discussed infra at notes 199, 210-12 and accompanying text.
122. For instance, when due process is at issue a federal court will often look
to state law to determine whether a "property" interest is at stake. See, e.g., Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). And for municipal liability under
§ 1983 courts must explore state law and custom to determine who has "final policy
making authority." See e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736-37
(1989). See generally Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986)
(distinguishing due process interpretation of state law from a § 1983 case where
plaintiffs sought to use state law to attribute responsibility to superiors); Jack M.
Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277 (1988) (discussing federal interpretation of
the takings clause); John P. Dwyer, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Eleventh
Amendment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 129, 159-60 (1987) (discussing the situation in which
a federal court must interpret state law to resolve a federal question).
123. See generally Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Brower v. County
of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
124. See, e.g., Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 1989) (willing to find
§ 1983 liability if the conditions of Texas's vicarious liability rule are met); Wood v.
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law of State B, meanwhile, creates no absolute liability on
behalf of the chief. Instead, the law of State B merely
provides that the chief of police is responsible for training and
supervising his subordinates. Assume further that the courts
of State B are willing to hold a superior personally liable
should she negligently forgo her obligation.
125
Assuming no complete diversity, 12  federal jurisdiction
over the chief of police in State A is certainly questionable. Of
course, a federal question premised on the Fourth Amendment
exists as to the offending officer. But what of the chief of
police? What supports a federal court's exercising subject
matter jurisdiction over him? He can be held responsible
based on State A's rule of vicarious liability, but only if the
federal court can hear the claim.
The ready answer to this problem rests with "pendent-party"
jurisdiction. It can be argued that because the state claim
against the police chief (based on vicarious liability) and the
federal claim against the offending officer (based on section
1983 and the Fourth Amendment) arise out of a "common
nucleus of operative fact," 27 the federal court should be able
to exercise jurisdiction over both. Once the federal court has
jurisdiction over the chief, the doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 28 requires that the court apply State A's law and
hold the chief vicariously liable.
29
Sunn, 865 F.2d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In a section 1983 action in this circuit,
vicarious liability may not be imposed in the absence of a state law imposing such
liability."), vacated, 880 F.2d 1011 (1989); McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968,969 (6th
Cir. 1972) (referring to state law to hold a supervisor vicariously liable for unconsti-
tutional conduct of an agent), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1973); Hesselgesser v.
Reilly, 440 F.2d 901,903 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that state law supported the imposi-
tion of liability on county sheriffs for civil rights violations perpetrated by their
deputies). Contra Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Monell
prohibits courts from allowing the vagaries of state law attribution rules to define the
contours of constitutional claims.").
125. See supra note 45 (collecting cases).
126. With complete diversity there would exist an independent jurisdictional
basis. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 n.12 (1976).
127. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991) (using the phrase "claims that
are so related.., that they form part of the same case or controversy"); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (coining the phrase "common nucleus of
operative fact").
128. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Robert H. Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman:
The Eleventh Amendment, Erie, and Pendent State Law Claims, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 227,
241 (1985) ("Since the Erie decision, a federal court hearing a claim based on state
law must follow that state's common law rules.").
129. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also McDaniel v. Carroll, 457 F.2d 968,969 (6th
Cir. 1972) (relying on pendent-party jurisdiction and Erie to hold a supervisor vicariously
liable for a § 1983 violation of a subordinate), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1973).
Accountability and Section 1983
Though the Supreme Court never completely disapproved
of pendent-party jurisdiction, it indicated in Aldinger v.
Howard3 ° that it would not allow pendent-party jurisdiction
to circumvent federal liability rules under section 1983.
Aldinger involved a section 1983 plaintiff who sought to have
pendent-party jurisdiction exercised over a municipality based
upon a municipal employee's constitutional violation and state
law that held municipalities vicariously liable. 13' The Court
rejected the invitation, holding that no federal jurisdiction
existed over the state law claim.'32
In reaching its conclusion the Court noted that it was not
attempting to "formulate any general, all-encompassing juris-
dictional rule."'33 Still, it expressed grave concerns about
whether federal jurisdiction could be exercised over a state law
claim where that claim was against a defendant not already
properly before the court.' 34 The Court avoided this broader
issue only by finding a congressional intent under section 1983
not to allow local governments to be brought "back within
[federal judicial] power merely because the facts also give rise
to an ordinary civil action against them under state law."'35
Of course, the specific holding in Aldinger-that local
government cannot be joined as a pendent party because of
Congress's contrary intent-was partially overruled by the
130. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
131. Id. at 4-5.
132. Id. at 16.
133. Id. at 13. The Court further stated that 'we decide here only the issue
of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under
§§ 1343(3) and 1983." Id. at 18. But the Court warned: "If the new party sought to
be joined is not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction, there is a more serious
obstacle to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction than if parties already before the court
are required to litigate a state-law claim." Id.
134. The Court stated:
[I]t is one thing to authorize two parties, already present in federal court by
virtue of a case over which the court has jurisdiction, to litigate in addition to
their federal claim a state-law claim over which there is no independent basis
of federal jurisdiction. But it is quite another thing to permit a plaintiff, who
has asserted a claim against one defendant with respect to which there is
federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely different defendant on the basis of a
state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction,
simply because his claim against the first defendant and his claim against the
second defendant "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."
Id. at 14; see also Finley v. U.S., 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (questioning the extent to
which Congress might constitutionally authorize pendent-party jurisdiction).
135. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
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Supreme Court's decision in Monell.36 Monell held that local
government can be sued under section 1983, at least where a
municipal policy or custom causes a federal violation.
137
Monell, however, does not mean that a state claim against
a municipality can be brought in federal court simply because
the claim is pendent to a section 1983 action against a
municipal official. Indeed, after Monell district courts contin-
ued to dismiss state claims against municipalities that were
joined with section 1983 actions against officials. For exam-
ple, federal courts have refused to entertain state law claims
against municipalities based either on indemnification 138 or
vicarious liability139 regardless of how closely connected the
state claim was to a section 1983 action pending against a
municipal official. Aldinger thus retained serious force even
after Monell. 40
136. See, e.g., Vacca v. Barletta, 753 F. Supp. 400, 402 (D. Mass. 1990) (noting
that Monell partially moots Aldinger, but the "basic holding of Aldinger ... is still
good law"), affd, 933 F.2d 31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194 (1991); Griffin v.
City of Chicago, 746 F. Supp 827, 828 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("There is some considerable
disagreement on the question whether municipalities are amenable to pendent party
claims on § 1983 actions post-Monell.").
137. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92; see also Brown, supra note 54, at 632-33.
138. See Peter Cassat, Note, Statutory Indemnification in Section 1983 Actions
Based on Police Misconduct: Choosing a Forum, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 605, 615-17.
Several federal courts, however, have entertained indemnity claims against local
governments regardless of the existence of a Monell policy or custom. See, e.g., Bell
v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the city
could be held liable under a Wisconsin indemnity statute for the § 1983 violations of
its agents); Cornelius v. La Croix, 631 F. Supp. 610, 621 (E.D. Wis. 1986), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 838 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1988).
139. See, e.g., Mathis v. Parks, 741 F. Supp. 567, 575 (E.D.N.C. 1990)
(dismissing a respondeat superior claim against a municipality because of Aldinger);
Grier v. Galinac, 740 F. Supp. 338, 340 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (dismissing a respondeat
superior claim against municipality because of Finley v. United States (Finley is
discussed infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text)); Flowers v. City of Harvey, 739
F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (answering negatively the "issue... whether a
court may exercise pendent party jurisdiction to hear a state tort claim filed against
a city when the underlying federal jurisdiction is based on a Section 1983 claim.").
Only where a Monell claim is also made against the city is jurisdiction certain. See,
e.g., Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding pendent jurisdiction
over a city on a state law claim proper where a "colorable or plausible" Monell claim
also exists against the city); see also Cassat, supra note 138, at 606, 613-14.
140. Applying state vicarious liability rules is troubling for the additional
reason that they are inconsistent with the Court's interpretation of § 1983. In Jett
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 732-33 (1989), the Court expressly refused
to "borrow" the common-law rule ofrespondeat superior to hold a municipality liable
under §§ 1981 and 1983 of Title 42. The Court did not rely onAldinger or any other
jurisdictional basis for its holding; rather, it found that it could not borrow the state
rule under § 1988, see infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text, because of the
state rule's inconsistency with § 1983's rejection of vicarious liability. 491 U.S. at
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In 1989 the Supreme Court in Finley v. United States14
1
reaffirmed its general aversion to pendent-party jurisdiction
by holding that state law claims against pendent parties could
not be joined in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 142  Congress responded to Finley in October of 1990 by
adding section 1367 to Title 28 of the United States Code.'
43
Section 1367(a) allows for pendent-party jurisdiction over state
claims that "are so related to claims in the action within [the
district court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution."
44
Arguably, section 1367(a) lifts Aldinger's bar to pendent-
party jurisdiction, leaving federal courts free to join municipal-
ities in section 1983 actions against municipal employees
733. Similarly, because § 1983 apparently does not countenance vicarious liability
in any context, one might argue that state attribution rules to the contrary cannot
be used in supervisory liability cases either. Cf. Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158,
1162 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Monell prohibits courts from allowing the vagaries of state law
attribution rules to define the contours of constitutional claims.").
141. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
142. Id. at 555-56. While expressing reservations about the general
constitutionality of pendent-party jurisdiction, id. at 549, the Court in Finley rea-
soned that to be properly applied, pendent-party jurisdiction must be given express
approval by Congress. Id. at 556. The Court concluded that the FTCA did not
include such an express authorization and that the private parties had to be
dismissed. Id. at 554-56.
143. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,904, S17,911-12 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(amendment of Sen. Biden to S. 2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), the text of which
was inserted into H.R. 5316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (enacted), 136 CONG. REC.
S17,583 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991)).
This legislation applies only to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990.
Federal Courts Study Committee Implementing Act/Judicial Improvements Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14 (1990); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367
practice commentary at 226 (West Supp. 1991); see also Brown v. Grabowski, 922
F.2d 1097, 1121 n.17 (3d Cir. 1990) (refusing to apply § 1367 to an action filed before
December 1, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991).
144. The text of section 1367(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall in-
clude claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). Section 1367(b) precludes pendent-party
jurisdiction (often know as ancillary jurisdiction) where federal jurisdiction is based
"solely on section 1332 [of Title 28]." Id. § 1367(b). Section 1367(c) grants the district
courts discretion to dismiss certain cases.
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regardless of Monell's policy or custom requirement.
145
Similarly, section 1367(a)'s approval of pendent-partyjurisdic-
tion arguably removes Aldinger's jurisdictional impediment to
using state law to support derivative supervisory liability.
146
Hence, under section 1367(a) one might successfully join a
state claim against a supervisor to a .section 1983 action
against a subordinate.
Using state law in this fashion to support derivative
supervisory liability, however, is hampered in two ways.
First, section 1367(c) grants district courts discretion to
decline pendent-party jurisdiction if: (1) the state claim is
"novel or complex," 141 (2) the state claim "substantially
predominates over the [federal] claim," 48 (3) the federal
claim has been dismissed, 49 or (4) other "compelling rea-
sons" exist. 5 ° State law thus offers no certainty.'
5'
Second, the exact scope of pendent-party jurisdiction under
section 1367(a) has yet to be determined. Arguably, pendent-
party jurisdiction is coextensive with pendent-claim jurisdic-
tion under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'52 leading one to
inquire whether the state and federal claims arise under a
"common nucleus of operative fact." Assuming Gibbs provides
the proper analysis, joining a state attribution claim against
a supervisor likely would not prove problematic. Such a claim
normally would be expected to arise from the same facts as the
section 1983 claim against the subordinate.
5 3
145. McCullough v. Uwchlan Township, No. 91-2071, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10763, at *8-9, 1991 WL 153078, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1991) (concluding that
§ 1367 overrules Finley and Aldinger); Steven H. Steinglass, New Act May Broaden
the Scope of Claims Involving Sec. 1983, NAT. L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 21 ("Sec. 1367
overrules Aldinger.").
146. See, e.g., Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1121 n.17 (3d Cir. 1990)
(suggesting that § 1367(a) solves the jurisdictional problem), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2827 (1991).
147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
148. Id. § 1367(c)(2).
149. Id. § 1367(c)(3).
150. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
151. District courts appear to have the same broad authority to dismiss
pendent parties as they do to dismiss pendent claims. As a practical matter then,
§ 1367 may offer little assistance to § 1983 litigants who seek to join additional
parties under state law. See Steinglass, supra note 145, at 21 ("Many district court
judges are reluctant to exercise pendent jurisdiction in Sec. 1983 litigation and
routinely dismiss state law claims.").
152. 383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966). A "pendent claim" is a state law claim that
arises against a party who is already properly before the federal court. "Pendent-
party"jurisdiction differs in that it attempts to bring litigants before the federal court
who could not be there but for a pendent-party theory of jurisdiction.
153. See, e.g., Mathis v. Parks, 741 F. Supp. 567, 574 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (finding
that pendent state claims against a city clearly arise under a common nucleus of
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The possibility exists, however, that pendent-party jurisdic-
tion might be more restrictive than pendent-claim jurisdiction,
or perhaps even non-existent. Section 1367(a) states that
pendent-party jurisdiction is proper only to the extent the
state and federal claims "form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III." s4 This leaves the constitu-
tional questions of whether pendent-party jurisdiction can ever
be proper, and if so, whether it extends as far as allowed by
Gibbs.'
In Finley the Court stated that the constitutional questions
surrounding pendent-party jurisdiction were still open.
56
Moreover, in both Finley and Aldinger the Court observed
"significant legal differences" between pendent claims and
pendent parties, 5 7 implying that Article III might prove
more restrictive for the latter. Joining supervisors as pendent
parties would then be more difficult.
I do not intend to speculate about the future of pendent-
party jurisdiction in this Article. My point is merely that its
usefulness as the sole basis for derivative supervisory liability
is uncertain. Return once again to the hypothetical case
arising in State A where a state vicarious liability claim is
made against the chief of police. In the past, district courts
have been reluctant to entertain these claims because of
questionable jurisdiction.'58 Even after the advent of section
operative fact, but not allowing these state claims to provide the basis for pendent-
party jurisdiction).
154. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991); see also Sarmiento v. Texas Bd.
of Veterinary Medical Examiners, 939 F.2d 1242, 1247 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that
the "Finley court assumed, without deciding, that pendent-party jurisdiction would
be within the constitutional grant of federal judicial power").
155. Pendent-party jurisdiction involves both statutory and constitutional
components. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989); Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.12 (1978).
156. 490 U.S. at 549 ("We may assume, without deciding, that the constitu-
tional criterion for pendent-party jurisdiction is analogous to the constitutional
criterion for pendent-claim jurisdiction, and that petitioner's state law claims pass
that test."). See generally Wendy C. Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing
Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539, 555 n.97 (1990) (discussing Article III
problems raised by pendent-party jurisdiction); Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 259-60 (arguing that
pendent parties are no different from pendent claims for Article III purposes).
157. Finley, 490 U.S. at 550; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); see also
supra note 134 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Molina, 725 F. Supp. 651, 654-55 (D.P.R. 1989). In
Figueroa, claims were brought under § 1983 against certain police officers and their
supervisor. A state claim based on vicarious liability was joined against the
supervisor. Id. at 653-54. The district court dismissed the direct § 1983 claim
against the supervisor because the charges against him were conclusory and failed
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1367(a) a federal court could dismiss the chief of police as a
defendant, either as a discretionary matter 159 or because
pendent-party jurisdiction is lacking. 6 °
What about the second case, where the law of State B does
not strictly attribute liability to the police chief, but instead
only creates a supervisory duty? Courts have not recognized
any jurisdictional problem with using state-created duties to
support supervisory liability under section 1983.16" Thus,
although using a state vicarious liability rule might fall
outside federal jurisdiction, the use of a state law duty
apparently does not.
Of course, one can always distinguish the two cases based on
the substance of the respective state laws. State A's law
independently attributes liability from one official to another.
State B, in contrast, offers only a portion of what is needed for
liability to attach. State B's duty must still be tied in with
section 1983 before the supervisor can be held accountable.
One might thus argue that because State B's law by itself does
not result in attribution of damages against the supervisor, it
is "in series " 62 with and parcel to a federal question. For
this reason, the use of State B's duty might appear more like
interpreting state law under guise of the "property" language
of the Due Process Clause,163 and as such might also appear
to fall within the ambit of a federal issue.
But this is an awkward explanation for why one claim can
proceed in federal court while the other cannot. In the first
place, vicarious liability is not that different from a substan-
tive duty. Indeed, vicarious liability can be expressed as
nothing more than an absolute duty to prevent the wrong from
occurring.' Next, arguing that state law duties are parcel
to a federal question says nothing about why attribution rules,
such as vicarious liability, are not. In either case state law is
to allege more than negligence. Id. at 653. Turning to the state claim against the
supervisor, the court held it had no pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. at 656. Hence,
the supervisor could not be held accountable for the federal wrongs of his subordi-
nates. See also supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. But see Bush v. Viterna,
795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Pennhurst to support a narrow interpreta-
tion of supervisory duty under state law).
162. See Dwyer, supra note 122, at 161.
163. See supra note 122.
164. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 69, at 499 (stating that vicarious
liability "is in one sense a form of strict liability").
Accountability and Section 1983
being retrieved to support a state actor's liability. Vicarious
liability would appear just as "in series" with a supervisory
liability question as a state law duty.
In any event, the point of this discussion is that complete
reliance on state law to support supervisory liability under
section 1983 raises a difficult jurisdictional issue for federal
courts. Granted, the problem is not insurmountable, espe-
cially in light of section 1367(a). Still, resolution of the
jurisdictional issue requires some rather creative and complex
legal reasoning. Moreover, the discretionary nature of
pendent-party jurisdiction would leave derivative supervisory
liability an always uncertain endeavor. The better course is
to avoid the problem altogether by federalizing the question of
duty.
165
2. Eleventh Amendment concerns-Assuming pendent-
party jurisdiction can be established, problems might still
emerge under the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme
Court's decision in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman66 (Pennhurst II) could bar the use of state law
altogether in supervisory liability suits under section 1983.167
The Fifth Circuit, for example, relying on Pennhurst, has stated
in the supervisory liability context that "the enforcement of
state law is the job of the states, and the federal civil rights
statute may not be used to bootstrap alleged violations of state
165. See infra notes 196-212 and accompanying text.
166. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
167. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 61 n.242 (1988) ("Although Pennhurst
evinces no intent to overturn the settled sovereign immunity doctrine that permits
damage suits against an officer individually, the logic of Pennhurst's abandonment
of the Young rationale in fact may threaten its viability." (citation omitted)).
Professor Althouse argues that the danger of a misinterpretation of state law
"counsels hesitation." Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal
Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1523 (1987). She continues: "If a
federal court can assume jurisdiction despite the state's lack of consent, it may
interpret the state law more broadly than the state court would, depriving the state
of control over its own law." Id. She concludes: "When the state has created a right
running against itself, but has failed to take the additional step of consenting to suit
in federal court, the federal court should find that jurisdiction properly belongs to the
state courts." Id. If Professor Althouse is correct, then Pennhurst logically applies
in the context of supervisory liability. But see George D. Brown, Beyond
Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress
to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343,
360 (1985) (arguing that federal court interpretation of state law is not that intrusive
in light of the Erie doctrine); Dwyer, supra note 122, at 145-48 (arguing that
abstention is sufficient to satisfy concerns surrounding misinterpretation of state law
unless the case is one of institutional liability).
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law into federal claims." 168  Hence, pendent-party jurisdic-
tional problems aside, the Eleventh Amendment might be
interpreted to prohibit using state law to support supervisory
liability.
Fortunately, a careful examination of Pennhurst reveals that
it should have no direct application in the context of supervi-
sory liability. Instead, Pennhurst appears concerned with suits
premised on state law that seek injunctive relief against the
government, and not with personal liability actions against its
officials.6 9 For purposes of supervisory liability, Pennhurst's
bark is worse than its bite.
Pennhurst involved a challenge in federal district court to
the conditions of care at a state-operated hospital in Pennsyl-
vania.170 Both federal' and state law claims'72 for dam-
ages and injunctive relief were joined in the suit. The district
court found violations of both federal and state law, and
though it did not award damages, 73 ordered massive equita-
ble relief.'74
The Pennhurst case suffered a lengthy appeal that took it to
the Supreme Court twice: once on the merits, and once to
address federal jurisdiction. As for the merits (the first
appeal),'75 the Supreme Court found that the federal law
168. Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986). Viterna did not use
Pennhurst to wholly defeat supervisory liability claims. Instead, it used Pennhurst
to support a more narrow focus on the definition of duty. Specifically, it held that the
question of duty is a federal one, and that state law is useful only to the extent it
helps to "identify the relevant state actors." Id. at 1206. To this extent Viterna
appears to present a sensible, though by no means compelled, reading of Pennhurst.
For a further discussion of the source of the duty to supervise, see infra notes
196-245 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
170. 465 U.S. at 92.
171. The plaintiffs in Pennhurst claimed the state hospital was operating in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6083. See 465 U.S. at -92.
172. The plaintiffs alleged the state hospital was being operated in violation
of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (1969 & Supp. 1983-84). 465 U.S. at 92.
173. The individual defendants were found to have acted in good faith and thus
were immune from damages. 465 U.S. at 93 n.1. The hospital, being an "arm of the
state," was protected from an award of damages by the Eleventh Amendment. 465
id. at 123-24.
174. Id. at 93.
175. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
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relied upon by the court of appeals to sustain the relief offered
no substantive protection to the plaintiffs.'76 The Court
remanded the action to the court of appeals to determine
whether some other ground, such as state law, might support
the district court's order."77 On remand the court of appeals
concluded that state law supported the district court's judg-
ment and its award of equitable relief.' The Supreme
Court again took the case, this time to decide whether federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim against state officials was
proper.1
79
The Court, following an extensive review of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, ruled that a federal court could not
award equitable relief against a state or its officers on the
basis of state law. 80 Instead, prospective relief against a
state was found to survive Eleventh Amendment scrutiny only
if the relief were grounded in federal law. The Court explained:
A federal court's grant of relief against state officials on
the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive,
does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law.
On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intru-
sion on state sovereignty than when a federal court
instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to
state law.
1 8 '
Following Pennhurst, a federal court's reliance on state law
to order equitable relief against state government is certainly
problematic. Indeed, courts have struggled with Pennhurst in
this context even where state law is parcel to the "property"
question of due process.182 The crucial question for purposes
176. Specifically, the Court ruled that the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6083, created no substantive
rights. 451 U.S. at 18-22. The Court was not called on to address any of the other
federal claims, as they were not relied upon by the court below. Id. at 30-32;
Pennhurst H, 465 U.S. at 94-95.
177. Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. at 31; Pennhurst I, 465 U.S. at 95.
178. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 661 (3d Cir.
1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984).
179. Pennhurst H, 465 U.S. at 96-97.
180. Id. at 123.
181. Id. at 106.
182. See, e.g., Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932-34 (6th Cir. 1985);
Delahoussaye v. Seale, 605 F. Supp. 1525, 1532 (W.D. La. 1985), affd, 788 F.2d 1091
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of supervisory liability is whether Pennhurst was intended to
likewise apply to damage actions against state officials.
The majority disavowed any intent to extend the Pennhurst
rationale to an action against a state official seeking monetary
damages. In distinguishing several prior Supreme Court
opinions where damages had been awarded against state
officers, the Court noted that "[n]one of these cases can be said
to be overruled by our holding today."'83 Only where injunc-
tive relief is sought against the state official, the Court ex-
plained, does the action "run more directly against the
State,"184 thus invoking the bar of the Eleventh Amendment.
Notwithstanding the dissent's protests to the contrary,
85
the majority's distinction in Pennhurst between equitable and
monetary relief appears sound, both from an internal and
external perspective. The distinction is internally consistent
because, as Professor Dwyer has explained, "the Court
(5th Cir. 1986); cf Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 512-14 (6th Cir. 1985)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of a complaint that required the federal court
to consider state law issues because the complaint also alleged violations of federal
law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
183. 465 U.S. at 110 n.19. The Court thus distinguished Johnson v. Lankford,
245 U.S. 541 (1918), as a case where "the relief sought was not injunctive relief but
money damages against the individual officer." Id. The Court also noted that many
of the cases cited by the dissent, including Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170
(1804); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 115 (1852); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); and Belknap v. Schild, 161
U.S. 10 (1896), "were actions for damages in tort against the individual officer." 465
U.S. at 111 n.21. The Court continued: "In Belknap the Court drew a careful
distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly
against the State. The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this
basis. Contrary to the view of the dissent, nothing in our opinion touches these
cases." Id. (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. The dissent in Pennhurst was not convinced that the Court was in reality
so limiting its decision:
Surely the Court cannot mean to rely on a distinction between damages and
injunctive relief, for it states: "A federal court's grant of relief against state
officers on the basis of state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not
vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. . . ." Awarding damages for a
violation of state law by state officers acting within their authority is
inconsistent with the majority's position that only a need to vindicate federal
law justifies the lifting of the Eleventh Amendment bar. If an order to pay
damages for wrongful conduct against a state officer is not against the State for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, an additional order in the form of an
injunction telling the officer not to do it again is no more against the State.
Id. at 135 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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indicated that its principal focus [was] the threat to sover-
eignty created when a federal court formulates injunctive
relief, not simply when it interprets state law." 8 ' The con-
cern of the Court was not so much the source of the claim, but
was instead the nature of the relief.'87 A distinction be-
tween monetary relief awarded against state officials and
injunctive relief against state officials, which is effectively
against the state, makes perfect sense.' 8
More importantly, the Court's distinction between equitable
relief and damages is necessary from an external vantage in
order to square Pennhurst with traditional rules of sovereign
immunity. As pointed out by the dissent, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has never protected government officials
from individual-capacity suits. 8 9 Even assuming that the
186. Dwyer, supra note 122, at 146.
187. See 465 U.S. at 117; see also Dwyer, supra note 122, at 145. Professor
Dwyer recognizes that the language in Pennhurst is not unambiguous:
Indeed, there is some language suggesting that the source of the claim-state
law-was the determinative factor in the Court's eleventh amendment analysis.
Nevertheless, the focus of the entire opinion, as well as some of the language,
suggests that the Court's new eleventh amendment doctrine will apply only to
institutional reform cases such as Pennhurst.
Id. (citation omitted). He argues persuasively, however, that if the source of the
claim-state law-was the Court's major concern (i.e., federal courts might incorrectly
interpret state law), abstention doctrines would have been sufficient medicine. Id.
at 146-48.
188. The majority of commentators who have addressed this issue conclude
that damage actions against state officials premised on state law survive Pennhurst.
See Dwyer, supra note 122, at 145-46 (arguing that Pennhurst is limited to institu-
tional reform cases); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REV. 61, 82 (1984) ("[11n the case in which an
individual officer is sought to be held personally liable for harm done, Pennhurst
seems to have no impact: a federal court damage suit against a state trooper for
fourth amendment violations can still be accompanied by a state law damage claim
sounding in tort."); Smith, supra note 128, at 268 ('Since a suit brought against a
state official 'individually' seeks no relief from the state, the eleventh amendment
presents no barrier to such an action in a federal court."); Louise Weinberg, The New
Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. REV. 1075, 1092 (1985) ("The
individual-capacity civil rights action for damages, even one against state officials,
even under state law, appears safe, for the present.").
189. See 465 U.S. at 132-33 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
quoted at length from an opinion by Justice Holmes:
"In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its immunity does
not extend to those that acted in its name .... The sovereign properly so called
is superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction always is amenable to the
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Eleventh Amendment was intended to codify sovereign
immunity, 190 it cannot protect government officials from
actions against them personally. The Eleventh Amendment is
implicated only where the relief operates against the
state.'9' Pennhurst, at least "for the present,"'92 should
not interfere with a federal court's use of state law to attribute
personal liability to government supervisors.
law.... An instrumentality of government he might be and for the greatest
ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be answerable for his
acts."
Id. at 132 n.8 (quoting Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd.
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549,568, 566-67 (1922)); see also Hafer v. Melo, 112
S. Ct. 358, 364 (1991) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against
suits to impose 'individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.");
Hopkins v. Clemson Agric. College, 221 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1911) (finding no sovereign
immunity for public agents when they are sued for their own torts).
190. This is a proposition subject to serious debate. See, e.g., Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1875 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(refusing to join part of the Court's opinion "because it presupposes the validity of
this Court's current characterization of the Eleventh Amendment as cloaking the
States with sovereign immunity"); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273,
2286 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that sovereign immunity's incorpora-
tion into the Eleventh Amendment was improper); see also Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the Eleventh Amend-
ment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 867 (1990)
(addressing whether the Eleventh Amendment was intended to codify sovereign
immunity).
191. The Eleventh Amendment, according to the Supreme Court, does not
protect "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). For this reason the applicability of
Pennhurst to state law claims against local government has been seriously
questioned. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court
Power: The Eleventh Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 643, 662 & n.96 (1985) (noting that Pennhurst may not apply to local
governments); Abigail English, The Pennhurst II Decision and Its Implications for
Foster Care Litigation, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 33, 36-37 (1984) (suggesting suing
county officials and local governments because they cannot invoke the Eleventh
Amendment bar if their funding relationship with the state is sufficiently attenu-
ated); Smith, supra note 128, at 266 ("Some pendent jurisdiction claims may still be
heard after Pennhurst II. For example, claims that do not seek relief from the
state--when relief is sought against county or municipal officials . .. ."). The Court
in Pennhurst, though presented with the issue because of the presence of local
government officials in the suit, skirted it by simply stating that "any relief granted
against the county officials on the basis of the state statute would be partial and
incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law would not appear
to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction." 465 U.S. at 124. Of course, if the commentary
cited above is correct, there would exist no Pennhurst problem with holding municipal
supervisors liable.
192. Weinberg, supra note 188, at 1092.
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Still, the only certain method for avoiding jurisdictional
problems is to federalize the question of duty. Without a
federal definition of duty, one is always faced with charting
the treacherous waters of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, even
if one can navigate these jurisdictional waters safely, absten-
tion principles might delay federal review.193 Assuming the
general viability of derivative supervisory liability (a proposi-
tion generally endorsed by the lower courts'94 ), federalizing
the question of duty presents a more solid foundation for its
framework.
195
193. For example, a federal court might choose to abstain to allow the state
courts to develop the state law question focusing on the supervisory duty. See, e.g.,
Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1204, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming a motion to
dismiss the state law claim where state law had not clearly specified who should be
responsible, or what their duty was). See generally Keith Werhan, Pullman
Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 449, 487 (1986). Where a state court action is already in progress, of course,
abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971), is also a possibility.
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether Younger abstention principles apply
with equal force to § 1983 damage actions, as opposed to suits for declaratory or
equitable relief. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1977). Some lower federal courts have extended Younger
abstention to damage actions, so long as the damage action might be "substantially
disruptive" to an ongoing criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448,
1449 (9th Cir. 1986). Others have simply ignored any distinction between actions for
damages and actions for declaratory or equitable relief. See, e.g., Nilsson v. Ruppert,
Bronson & Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1989). At least one court has
refused to extend Younger to an action under § 1983 for damages. See Lebbos v.
Judges of Superior Court, Santa Clara County, 883 F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 1989); see
also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (allowing federal courts to dismiss
certain "novel or complex" state law claims).
194. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
195. Note that the Court in Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991), held that
state officials acting in their individual capacities are not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from damages. Id. at 364. This would seem to militate
against extending Pennhurst's Eleventh Amendment rationale to officials. But
assuming Pennhurst were to be extended to actions against government officials,
Congress certainly has the power to override the limitation. See, e.g., Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989); Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242-43 (1985); see also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 70-71 (1989) (noting that Congress can
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
so long as its intent is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute). Whether
Congress has chosen to impose derivative liability on supervisors thus becomes the
critical question-one I address in Part III. Cf Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
338-45 (1979) (finding that § 1983 does not overcome a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
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III. TOWARD A FEDERAL DUTY
A. Source of the Duty
Any attempt to develop a duty to supervise under section
1983 must first overcome repeated rhetoric that section 1983
was intended only as a remedial device, devoid of substantive
meaning.'96 If that position were correct, how could section
1983 be interpreted to include a supervisory duty? Duty
appears to be a normative creature, and section 1983 must be
divorced from such substantive concerns.
The answer is simple. The Supreme Court can find a
federal duty to supervise under section 1983 in the same
fashion it has found other substantive rules under section
1983-by resort to a federal common law of civil rights
jurisprudence.'97 Of course, a lively debate continues over
whether Congress intended to grant federal courts this
196. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979), the
Court observed:
Unlike the 1866 and 1870 Acts, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not
provide for any substantive rights-equal or otherwise. As introduced and
enacted, it served only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for
violations of the Constitution.... No matter how broad the § 1 cause of action
may be, the breadth of its coverage does not alter its procedural character.
Even if claimants are correct in asserting that § 1983 provides a cause of action
for all federal statutory claims, it remains true that one cannot go into court
and claim "a violation of § 1983"-for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone
against anything.
Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted). Thus, to make use of § 1983 one must always rely
on an outside substantive predicate, such as a duty or prohibition found in the
Constitution or laws of the United States. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144
n.3 (1979) ("[Section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States
Constitution and federal statutes that it describes."). Professor Burnham recently
observed that "[because section 1983 enforces the Constitution and 'is not itself a
source of substantive rights,' the proper scope of section 1983, at least in terms of
duties, can only be the scope of the Constitution itself." William Burnham,
Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed
Constitutional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN.L. REV. 515, 572 (1989) (citations omitted).
But see Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 916 F.2d 284, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding § 1983 substantively restrictive), affd on other grounds, 60 U.S.L.W. 4182
(U.S. Feb. 26, 1992).
197. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) ("'[Flederal common law' [refers] to any rule of
federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments--constitutional or congressional.").
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authority.19 Those caught up in remedial rhetoric would
find it difficult to embrace such an approach. But others have
persuasively argued that the Forty-second Congress envisioned
a common-law approach to section 1983, whereby the federal
courts actively construct substantive as well as remedial rules.
Professor Kreimer, for example, using section 1988 of Title
42,' has argued that Congress intended to give federal
courts authority to fill in section 1983 with an evolving federal
jurisprudence.200 Professor Kreimer asserts that because the
Reconstruction Congress (responsible for both section 1983
and the "borrowing" portion of section 1988) "lived in the era
of Swift," a time when "[flederal courts were wont to expound
the common law in diversity cases,. . . section 1988 is explicit
statutory authority to do the same in the newly-created civil
rights jurisdiction."20 ' Professor Kreimer contends that
federal courts need not feel constrained by the common law of
the mid-nineteenth century because "[u]nder Swift, courts
198. Compare Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressionally-
Mandated Approach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV. 665, 668
(1986) (arguing for the "application of state law in civil rights cases") with Seth F.
Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 630 (1985) ("Federal courts should naturally... undertake
to establish a common law of civil rights actions.") and Peter M. Zante, Note, Choice
of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 512 (1970) (arguing in favor of
federal common law, at least where "issues are bound up with the definition of the
extent of... federal rights"). Cf. Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil
Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 543 (1980)
("Federal courts should fill out the federal civil rights program by the same
techniques used to fill out other federal programs.").
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1988 of Title 42, originally adopted in
1866, directs federal courts to apply "the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes" of the forum state where federal law is "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies." Id. For an excellent discussion
of the uses to which § 1988 has been put, see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach
to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989).
To date § 1988 has been used to borrow state law only in the contexts of state
survival statutes, see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 587-95 (1978), and
statutes of limitations, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985).
200. Kreimer, supra note 198, at 619-30. Professor Eisenberg for quite
different reasons has reached what appears to be a similar conclusion-that § 1983
should be filled in with federal and not state rules. Professor Eisenberg concludes
that § 1988 has application only "to actions that are removed from state to federal
court pursuant to civil rights removal provisions." Eisenberg, supra note 198, at 500.
Professor Eisenberg thus eschews the general use of § 1988 to borrow state law, id.
at 516-17, and rejects the argument that § 1988 was intended to authorize the
development of federal common law. Id. at 515. Instead, Professor Eisenberg simply
concludes that '[f]ederal courts should fill out the federal civil rights program by the
same techniques used to fill out other programs." Id. at 543.
201. Kreimer, supra note 198, at 619.
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sitting in diversity acknowledged the necessity of the evolution
of the common law. "2 °2 Congress knew this and intended to
impart this authority to the courts.
Regardless of whether Professor Kreimer's thesis that
Congress intended to allow federal courts to fill in section 1983
is correct, °3 the Supreme Court repeatedly has assumed the
authority to do so.2" The most notable instances of section
1983 common law are the Court's creation of official immuni-
ties 20  and its development of institutional liability.
206
Rules surrounding causation 20 7  and monetary damages
28
are additional examples. The weight of precedent20 9 conse-
quently refutes any suggestion that section 1983 is devoid of
meaning.
One might argue that instead of creating a federal duty,
courts should use section 1988 to borrow existing state law
202. Id. Professor Kreimer concludes: "Let us admit freely that federal courts
can and do make law in civil rights litigation. In making such law courts must
remember that, in adopting section 1988, Congress has not foresworn an interest in
national uniformity. Rather it has put its imprimatur on a federal common law." Id.
at 630.
203. Undoubtedly, § 1983 needs elaboration. "[Slection 1983 does not address
a host of. . issues, including the burden of proof, immunities, supervisory liability,
affirmative defenses, and statutes of limitations." Eisenberg, supra note 198, at 510.
204. See infra notes 205-09 (collecting cases). See generally Beermann, supra
note 199, at 54-76; Eisenberg, supra note 198, at 510; Kreimer, supra note 198, at 604.
205. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See generally
Beermann, supra note 199, at 66-70; Kreimer, supra note 198, at 610.
206. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978);
see Gerhardt, supra note 87, at 543 ("[Tlhe Court has effectively established a special
body of federal common law on the accountability of municipalities in federal court
for constitutional violations.").
207. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277,284-85 (1980) (holding that
a parole board's release of a prisoner did not cause the decedent's death, regardless
of state law duties); see Kreimer, supra note 198, at 611 ("The Court has apparently
decided to incorporate a proximate cause test into section 1983 as a matter of federal
common law.").
208. See Beermann, supra note 199, at 72 ("Carey v. Piphus, for example,...
can be interpreted as creating a completely federal rule of damages." (citation
omitted)).
209. The Court has at least on one occasion recognized the argument in favor
of a common-law § 1983 jurisprudence. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,
589 n.5, 593 (1978) (noting that "Section 1988's reference to 'the common law' might
be interpreted as a reference to the decisional law of the forum State, or as a
reference to the kind of general common law that was an established part of our
federal jurisprudence by the time of § 1988's passage in 1866" (citing Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842))). Several commentators have observed that the Court has
always been willing to fill in § 1983 with its own brand of common law without ever
making reference to § 1988. See Beermann, supra note 199, at 60-63; Eisenberg,
supra note 198, at 510-11; Kreimer, supra note 198, at 604.
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duties.21 ° At least three objections to such an approach are
apparent. First, using section 1988 to borrow state law still
gives states leeway to avoid supervisory liability by altering
their duties. Second, such an approach would tend to generate
a lack of uniformity in federal law.21' Finally, certain du-
ties, such as the absolute duty encompassed by vicarious
liability, likely would be deemed inconsistent with section
1983, resulting in their being discarded.212 State duties
would therefore eventually be measured by section 1983
jurisprudence anyway, with the "borrowing" technique devolv-
ing into nothing more than a new brand of federal common
law.
Assuming that section 1983 can be interpreted to encompass
a federal duty to supervise, the next question is whether it
should. Although the legislative history behind section 1983
might appear inconclusive on this precise point,21' the Forty-
second Congress's debates suggest that Congress intended to
remedy at least some forms of official inaction." 4 Of course,
this falls short of an express congressional intention to adopt
210. Section 1988 in effect turns the state rule into a federal rule, at least for
purposes of the case at hand. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588 ("Regardless of the
source of the law applied in a particular case, however, it is clear that the ultimate
rule adopted under § 1988 '"is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a
federal right is impaired."'" (citations omitted)). For this reason, the jurisdictional
problems discussed above, see supra notes 122-95 and accompanying text, are
avoided.
211. See Beermann, supra note 199, at 58, 62; Eisenberg, supra note 198, at
517; Kreimer, supra note 198, at 619-20; Zante, supra note 198, at 512; cf. Coleman,
supra note 198, at 668 (arguing that § 1983's purposes set a national threshold even
when courts look to state law under § 1988).
212. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). In Jett the
Court refused to use § 1988 to borrow common-law respondeat superior to hold a local
government liable under §§ 1981 and 1983. Id. at 732-33. The Court found vicarious
liability to be inconsistent with § 1983. Id. at 733; see also supra note 140.
213. See Kreimer, supra note 198, at 605 ("[T]wo decades of excursions into the
Congressional Globe of 1871 have convinced most observers that the legislative
history of section 1983 is, in the main, unhelpful .... [F]ew lawyers are unable to
find support for their position in those turbulent debates.").
214. See supra note 108; see also Developments in fhe Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1154 (1977) (observing that § 1983 'was aimed
at least as much at the abdication of law enforcement responsibilities by Southern
officials as it was at the Klan's outrages"); Note, supra note 93, at 557 ("The legisla-
tive history of section 1983 strongly suggests that Congress intended to remedy at
least some forms of passive official behavior leading to constitutional infringe-
ments."); cf. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitu-
tional Tort: Deshaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 119 (1991) ('[T]here
is affirmative evidence that the fourteenth amendment was intended to recognize a
state's obligation to protect its citizens from harm."); Beermann, supra note 33, at
1083 (same).
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a general supervisory duty. But it at least demonstrates that
the Forty-second Congress could not have intended an outright
rejection of omissions and duties as predicates for section 1983
liability.
Though legislative history might not clearly establish a
congressional intent to impose a general supervisory duty,
legal history does. Tort law has always recognized that
omissions "cause" results,21 a fact presumably known by the
Forty-second Congress."' It would seem only natural that
Congress assumed that the causation language of section 1983
would be read consistently with the common-law rules already
in place. And when one considers that mid- to late-nineteenth
century law generally recognized a duty on behalf of govern-
ment officials to oversee their subordinates,217 believing that
the Forty-second Congress intended a similar duty to exist
under section 1983 is not difficult.
Moreover, recognition of a federal duty under section 1983
will promote deterrence by denouncing incompetent govern-
ment."' Officials will be forewarned that society expects
competence and will accept no less. Responsibility will be
enhanced because officials will not have the luxury of claiming
"I wasn't involved"-the clear rejoinder to any such defense
will be "you should have been." Officials who occupy command
positions will be encouraged to exercise control, and the result
will be fewer illegalities. Government accountability, and
hence deterrence, will be served.
Section 1983's compensatory purpose will also be advanced
by the enhanced potential for recovery"' and the availability
of attorney's fees under section 1988.220 And because supervi-
sory fault is a prerequisite for recovery22' no claim of injustice
215. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
218. Cf SCHUCK, supra note 19, at 16 ("Public tort law implicates five primary
social goals or constraints: to deter wrongdoing, to encourage vigorous decision-
making by officials, to compensate victims of official misconduct, to exemplify
society's moral principles, and to achieve institutional competence and legitimacy.")
219. If state law were to form the sole basis for recovery from the supervisor,
state law could also limit the plaintiff's damages. Section 1983 does not limit
compensatory or punitive damages in this regard. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-64 (1978) (discussing the fact that compensatory damages, including mental and
emotional distress are recoverable under § 1983); cf. City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (finding a municipality not subject to punitive
damages under § 1983).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (providing that the "prevailing party" is entitled
to a "reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs").
221. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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can be made by the superior officer.222 Rather, holding the
supervisor accountable clearly serves corrective justice. 3
In short, no policy indigenous to section 1983 supports distin-
guishing supervisory nonfeasance from misfeasance.
224
222. Indeed, Professors Wells and Eaton argue that "it is unjust to permit the
defendant to ignore the plaintiffs predicament when he himself has played some role
in bringing it about." Wells & Eaton, supra note 106, at 38. Where a government
agent, such as a police officer, is directly responsible for the harm, the government
has played a role in the harm and is justly put to a duty to help correct it. See id.
This principle is analogous to the common law exception to the no-duty rule
when the defendant is connected with the plaintiff or his injury in some way.
The individual may have an obligation to help if this conduct is causally, though
not culpably, related to the harm, or if he has undertaken to help the plaintiff,
or if there is some special relationship between him and the plaintiff, like
common carrier and passenger or landlord and tenant.
Id. (citations omitted).
223. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts:
Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82 (1989). Professor
Jeffries explains corrective justice as being the sole theory to support compensation
for constitutional torts:
The government has achieved a wrongful gain ... by inflicting a wrongful loss.
The award of damages from government to victim at once annuls the wrongful
gain and rectifies the wrongful loss. The payment from wrongdoer to victim
retraces the moral relationship between them. To the extent possible, it undoes
the wrong .... This restorative transfer from wrongdoer to victim is intelligible
as corrective justice, without regard to distributive effect.
Id. at 94.
224. Professors Wells and Eaton argue that although the nonfeasance-
misfeasance distinction serves valid goals in relation to private actors, it does not
serve these same goals when applied to public officials:
The rationale for the no-duty rule differs sharply depending on whether the
defendant is public or private. The no-duty rule as applied to individuals rests
primarily on libertarian values. A state-imposed duty to act would seriously
impinge upon individual freedom and autonomy.... Furthermore, a tort duty
to act is thought to undermine the moral worth of an individual's decision to
help another person in distress. ...
When the defendant is a government or its officer, individual autonomy is
not an issue. Consequently, the no-duty rule must look elsewhere for support.
Wells & Eaton, supra note 106, at 3-4; see also Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366
N.E.2d 1210, 1218 (Mass. 1977) (holding that when dealing with public officials,
distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance "have no real connection with
sound reasoning or policy"); Reckman v. Keiter, 164 N.E.2d 448, 457 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959) ("In determining the liability of a public official for acts of his deputies, no
distinction is drawn between acts done virtute officii and acts done colore officii, and
it makes no difference whether the act done is classified as nonfeasance, misfeasance
or malfeasance.").
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Of course, one might always attempt to reach beyond the
immediate contours of section 1983 and make the generic
argument that official liability for nonfeasance will deter
public officials from exercising their "discretion in allocating
limited public resources, " "' or in some other way influence
those seated in government. Additionally, one can argue that
exposure to personal liability for nonfeasance deters qualified
persons from seeking public office.226
Even assuming that the prospect of personal liability affects
the judgment of supervisory officers,227 a distinction between
official nonfeasance and misfeasance in the context of deriva-
tive supervisory liability is not justified. Supervisory officials
are continually entangled in the affairs of their subordinates.
Supervisors are always acting and omitting with no clear line
between the two. Addressing concerns of undue influence or
skewed discretion by attempting to dissect supervisory acts
from omissions seems impractical at best. At worst, it
amounts to an arbitrary endeavor.
In any event, the fears of curtailing official discretion and
deterring persons from seeking office are adequately addressed
by existing immunity doctrines,228 particularly the qualified
225. Wells & Eaton, supra note 106, at 5.
226. See, e.g., State v. Reichert, 80 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ind. 1948) ("Competent
persons would not be willing to accept positions which imposed upon them liability
for torts and wrongs committed by subordinates . ").
227. But see Martin J. Jaron, Jr., The Threat of Personal Liability Under the
Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local
Government?, in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 309 (Robert H. Freilich &
Richard G. Carlisle eds. 1983):
The threat of personal liability for state and local officials under ... § 1983 does
not appear to be so great as to interfere with the performance of government by
inhibiting officials in the performance of their duties. This conclusion is
substantiated by the limited attempts to monitor the precise effects of personal
liability on the behavior of public officials.
Id. at 334; cf. Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Execu-
tive Official Immunity, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 248 (1984) (observing that there exists
'no data showing that the costs [of a lesser immunity] had a significant adverse effect
on executive decision-making").
228. See Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1217-18 (rejecting the distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance and observing that officials receive adequate protection
from immunity); Kinports, supra note 20, at 601 (noting that qualified immunity "pro-
tect[s] public officials from being sued for every error in judgment, thereby diverting
their attention from their public duties, preventing them from independently
exercising their discretion because of the fear of damages liability, and discouraging
qualified persons from seeking public office at all"); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
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immunity now available for all government officials.22 9 The
Supreme Court has tailored qualified immunity to insulate
government officials from the influence of harassing liti-
gation."' Hence, an official who fails to perform his as-
signed duties will escape liability so long as the constitutional
right violated was not clearly established.2"' Rejection of
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Laws, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104
HAlv. L. REV. 1731, 1822 (1991) (noting that even in cases of individual liability,
officials often are "indemnified by their governmental employers").
229. Courts have uniformly recognized that supervisors exposed to potential
derivative liability may invoke qualified immunity. See, e.g., Brown v. Grabowski,
922 F.2d 1097, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding immunity because no direct, personal
involvement existed), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1991); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479-80 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that a supervisor is
immune to § 1983 damages unless a reasonable person in her position would know
that her conduct violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights, but not finding
immunity on the facts of the case); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836, 840 (11th
Cir. 1990) (same); Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1066-67 (2d Cir.
1989); Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82, 85 (4th Cir. 1989). One question that arises is
whether a supervisor's immunity must be coextensive with the perpetrator-
subordinate's. Though few courts have addressed the issue, it appears that the
immunities in any particular case need not be equal. In Cleveland-Perdue v.
Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 368 (1990), for exam-
ple, the court found a "supervisor of supervisors" immune, but not the supervisor
directly under him. Id. at 429. Thus, Brutsche indicates that the party further
removed from the actual violation might enjoy a greater chance at succeeding under
the immunity defense. In Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986), however, the opposite was true. The court there
affirmed a finding of immunity for a police officer (Wheeler) who was present when
his partner (Vitale) used excessive force against a suspect because Wheeler could not
have reasonably known that the shooting would take place. Id. at 819. The court in
turn rejected the police chiefs (Forni) defense of qualified immunity: "Unlike
Wheeler's situation ... we believe that a wrongful shooting would be the type of
result that would be likely to arise-and hence be 'known' under Harlow-from a
failure to train police officers in the proper use of weapons." Id. at 822 n.7.
230. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984) ("The qualified immunity
- doctrine recognizes that officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only if
they reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for
damages and only if unjustified lawsuits are quickly terminated."); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official
Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1978 at 8, 26 ("The major explicit
reason for insulating officials from damage actions is the fear that damages will
induce timidity in them.").
231. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). See generally
Kinports, supra note 20, at 600-07 (reviewing Harlow and the Supreme Court's
shaping of qualified immunity). Some supervisors performing quasi-legislative tasks
might even be entitled to absolute immunity, see, e.g., Healy v. Town of Pembroke
Park, 831 F.2d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court's dismissal on
absolute immunity grounds because the mayor and commissioners acted in a
legislative capacity when they voted on how to provide police services to the town),
though given that most local officials act in wholly administrative and executive
capacities absolute immunity should be uncommon, see, e.g., Cordero v. De Jesus-
Mendez, 867 F.2d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that where no constitutional
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nonfeasance as a basis for supervisory liability would disrupt
the delicate balance presently achieved through the immunity
doctrines. Indeed, it would be overkill in favor of blameless
government.
B. Nature of the Duty
Assuming that a federal supervisory duty is recognized
under section 1983, the next issue becomes the exact terms of
that obligation. As discussed above, the law traditionally has
recognized several supervisory duties, some more specific than
others.2 32 At a minimum, government officials normally
have been expected to "oversee" subordinates in a reasonable
fashion so as to not "furnish the opportunity for the de-
fault."233  In other words, supervisory government officials
are expected to reasonably manage subordinates in order to
minimize the risk of illegal behavior.
A federal supervisory duty likewise should obligate an
official occupying a control position to manage her subordi-
nates "adequately".234 If a superior has the ability (power)
to control others' actions she is obligated to act. The key is
ability;235 the supervisor must actually be in a position to
control the wrongdoer.236
violation was established, the mayor could not be held liable, but where the mayor
did violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights while acting as an administrator, he
could not claim qualified immunity); see generally JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L.
SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 2.08[C] (1987).
232. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
233. MECHEM, supra note 42, § 790, at 529.
234. I use the adverb "adequately" at this point because I do not yet wish to
address the appropriate standard of care to be imposed. Standards of care, of course,
range from strict liability to the requirement that one avoid only purposeful conduct.
I hope to establish in Part III.E that reasonableness is the appropriate standard of
care for supervisory liability. See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
235. The general tort rule is that one who is obligated to act need only do that
which "he reasonably can." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 56, at 377. For
example, a parent who fails to save his drowning child is responsible only if the
parent can swim. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 106, § 3.3(c), at 208-09.
236. Consistent with this approach, in order to possess the ability to control
subordinates a supervisor must know she is in a position of power. Though she need
not necessarily know of her subordinates' actions, see supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text and infra note 291 and accompanying text, she must at least be
aware that she is in charge. This is not to be confused with knowing one is under a
legal duty to act. Generally, one need only be aware of the circumstances that give
rise to the duty to be held accountable. One need not know of the actual duty. See
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State law "obligations," such as strict vicarious liability or
a general duty to oversee subordinates, though relevant,
should not control the federal definition of duty." ' Instead,
the federal focus should be more specific, asking whether the
hierarchical structure of government and the surrounding
circumstances in a particular case gave the supervisor the
ability to direct or otherwise control the subordinate at is-
sue. 23 8 A supervisor saddled with vicarious liability by state
law may in fact be so far removed from the offending subordi-
nate that she could exercise no control whatsoever.239 At the
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 106, § 3.3(b), at 207-08. For instance, a parent who
fails to save his drowning child is accountable so. long as he knew it was his child.
It is irrelevant that the parent did not know of the law's imposition of the duty to
save the child. See id. § 3.3(b), at 208. Again, the concern is avoiding strict,
vicarious liability. An individual who unknowingly is made chief of police should not
be held accountable for the actions of the police force notwithstanding her failure to
supervise.
237. See, e.g., Bush v. Viterna, 795 F.2d 1203, 1209 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding
that state law should only be used "to identify the persons responsible for an
identified civil rights violation," and not to woodenly attribute liability to them).
238. The Court's recent decision in Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
701 (1989), offers an appropriate model for how the duty inquiry should proceed. In
Jett the Court expressed a willingness to peruse state law to determine which local
government officials possess "final authority" to bind the local government under
§ 1983. The Court stated:
As with other questions of state law relevant to the application of federal law,
the identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official policy
of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the
trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury. Reviewing the relevant
legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well as "'custom or
usage' having the force of law," . .. the trial judge must identify those officials
or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority ....
Id. at 737 (citation omitted).
Although under Jett state law forms the central focus of the search for final
authority, the analysis still is federal in character. Even if state law were to provide
expressly that official X possessed no authority, a court could still conclude he was
a policymaker. Common custom and practice are also relevant to the analysis and
must be considered in conjunction with state law. The federal question under § 1983
that emerges from Jett is whether 'authority" existed under state law and practice.
State law, local law, custom, and usage are the evidence used to answer this federal
question.
239. See, e.g., Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82, 84 (4th Cir. 1989) (involving a
superior who was unable, given state law, to prevent the harm to the plaintiff);
Gomm v. DeLand, 729 F. Supp. 767, 781 (D. Utah 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding a prison warden unable to order treatment for an inmate, and thus not
liable under a theory of supervisory liability); Lyons v. Powell, 729 F. Supp. 1404,
1405 (D.N.H. 1989) (noting that a supervisor must have the 'power and duty to
alleviate the conditions which led to the violation" to be liable (quoting Miranda v.
Munoz, 770 F.2d 255, 260 (1st Cir. 1985))).
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other extreme, an immediate supervisor who is expressly
insulated from liability by local law might still have the power
and ability to direct the subordinate's action.24 °  Ability
should be addressed in light of state law, but also indepen-
dently of it.
241
Of course, the mere existence of a supervisory duty cannot
immediately result in the superior's being held responsible.
The question of breach remains.242 The fact finder must
240. Local government may not insulate itself from a federal inquiry in
municipal liability cases. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988), the
Court stated:
[E]gregious attempts by local governments to insulate themselves from liability
... are precluded by a separate doctrine.... [We have] long recognized that a
plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is "so
permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force
of law."
Id. at 127 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)); see also
Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492, 902 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that
although state law is the focus of inquiry, "lawfully empowered decisionmakers
cannot insulate themselves from liability under section 1983 by knowingly allowing
a subordinate to exercise final policymaking authority"); Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783,
793 (11th Cir. 1989) ("In making this determination, the court should examine not
only the relevant positive law, including ordinances, rules and regulations, but also
the relevant customs and practices having the force of law.")
241. The analysis should be a functional one. A supervisor might possess the
ability to control subordinates in relation to task x, but not task y; a duty would thus
exist only in the context of the former. For instance, a police chief might have the
power to control how arrests are made, but be unable to make personnel decisions.
See Crowley v. Prince George's County, 890 F.2d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding
that with respect to final policy making authority, the police chief had no authority
to make personnel decisions though he may have had authority in other areas).
Section 1983 liability might therefore attach to the chief for Fourth Amendment
violations, but not for any unconstitutional employment decisions his subordinates
make. A similar approach has been used by the Court to address the question of
whether a government official is a final authority who binds local government by her
actions. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 n.12 (1986).
242. The lower courts appear to have analyzed the breach requirement in
terms of causation. See, e.g., Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362, 364 (9th
Cir. 1990) (finding that a person violates § 1983 if he "omits to perform an act which
he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation"), affd in part, rev'd in part
en banc, 942 F.2d 1435 (1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3520 (1992); Hewett v.
Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that a "violation of a duty
imposed by state law resulting in constitutional injury will establish a causal
connection sufficient to trigger supervisory liability"); Howard v. Fortenberry, 723
F.2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir.) ("[N]o defendant can be held liable unless it is shown that
he breached some duty imposed by state law, and that the breach had some causal
connection with the constitutional deprivation."), vacated in part on other grounds,
728 F.2d 712, 713 (1984). As noted earlier, see supra notes 105-07 and accompany-
ing text, when speaking of omissions the question of causation tends to become
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conclude that the superior did not abide by his affirmative
obligation.243 It may be that a superior has done all he
possibly can to prevent unconstitutional conduct, or perhaps
has otherwise "adequately" looked after his subordinates. If
he has, then the supervisor is not blameworthy and he should
not be held accountable.
The question of breach is thus nothing more than a question
of culpability. Breach asks what should have been done under
the circumstances. If one does not do what should have been
done, then she has breached her duty of care. And if she has
breached her duty of care, she is culpable. The problem thus
comes full circle to the question of culpability and what
superiors must do to avoid breaching their duties.
No set criteria exist for fulfilling any given duty. Instead,
one placed under an affirmative obligation to act is normally
expected to perform "reasonably."244 Wide latitude is af-
forded the individual to select the appropriate course of action.
All that is required is that the course chosen prove reasonable.
Consider, for example, a good samaritan who offers assis-
tance to an injured traveler and thereby assumes a duty to
care for the traveler.245 Identifying exactly what the good
samaritan must do for the traveler is impossible. Instead, the
good samaritan is only expected to act reasonably; he can
choose his actions, so long as a normal person would not look
upon his choice as being a negligent one. Hence, he might
summon aid by dialing "911" or he might bandage the
traveler's wounds and send him on his way. Either could
suffice.
Nothing more can be expected of a government official. She
should be given the latitude to choose those actions and
omissions that satisfy her affirmative obligation. Only if her
choice does not measure up to society's expectations should
she be held responsible.
murky. Perhaps the better approach is to avoid causation language altogether and
simply focus on whether the defendant failed to perform the obligation imposed upon
her by law.
243. The question of breach is a factual one to be decided by the appropriate
fact finder. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (stating that
whether the final authority's act or acquiescence caused the constitutional depriva-
tion is a factual question for the jury).
244. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 56, at 377.
245. Id. § 56, at 378.
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C. Culpability and Precedent
Of course, all of this begs the question of the exact standard
of care to be imposed on government officials. Traditionally,
the law has only expected of government officials what it has
expected from everyone else-reasonableness."' Hence, a
superior who reasonably watched after his subordinates was
secure from personal liability regardless of the subordinates'
actions. Only a negligent supervisor was accountable.
The predominant view that has emerged under section 1983,
however, is much more tolerant of government nonfeasance.
Lower courts have held that a supervisor is liable for constitu-
tional wrongs practiced by a subordinate only where the
supervisor either "super-carelessly" allowed the wrongs to take
place,247 or was aware of the subordinate's illegal con-
duct.24 Under either standard negligent supervisors are not
held accountable.
To date, lower courts have failed to provide an adequate
explanation for why less has been required of government
officials under section 1983. Those courts that have attempted
to justify a more tolerant standard of care for supervisors have
tended to cite Supreme Court precedent beginning with
Parratt v. Taylor249 and ending with Daniels v. Williams."'
246. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Of course, government officials
sometimes enjoy the protections of governmental immunity, thus absolving them of
liability in certain situations where private individuals would be held accountable.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 132, at 1056.
247. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
249. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986). The Court concluded in Parratt that "[n]othing in the language of § 1983
or its legislative history limits the statute solely to intentional deprivations of
constitutional rights." 451 U.S. at 534. The Court accordingly held that negligence
could support a § 1983 cause of action, so long as it also satisfied the constitutional
provision at issue. Id. at 535. See generally Laura Oren, Signing into Heaven:
Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe
v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 36-40 (1991) (analyzing Parratt).
250. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Courts citing these cases include: Leach v. Shelby
County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173
(1990) (citing Daniels for the proposition that "a claim of failure to supervise or
properly train under section 1983 cannot be based on simple negligence"); Stevenson
v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing both Parratt and
Daniels and concluding that supervisory negligence is not actionable); Delbridge v.
Schaeffer, 569 A.2d 872, 889 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (citing Daniels for the
proposition that negligent supervision is not actionable).
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A few have even referred to City of Canton v. Harris.2"' But
neither Parratt, Daniels nor Harris support requiring less of
government personnel than common, everyday citizens.
Parratt held that a claim of official negligence could, under
appropriate circumstances, support a claim for relief under
section 1983.2"2 Daniels raised the particular level of culpa-
bility required for a due process violation, but reaffirmed
Parratt's interpretation of section 1983.253 The net effect of
these two cases was thus an explicit rejection of any inherent
limiting principle within section 1983.
The assumption that Parratt and Daniels were intended to
restrict the meaning of section 1983 inverts the natural
implication of those cases. Parratt and Daniels's rejection of
a mens rea standard for section 1983 expands the potential for
liability rather than restricts it.
Moreover, supervisory responsibility presents an altogether
different question than that considered in either Daniels or
Parratt. Both of those cases were concerned with whether the
Constitution was violated at all by a street-level government
official." 4 Nothing in either Parratt or Daniels suggests
that the requirement of constitutional fault extends beyond
the perpetrator. When speaking of derivative supervisory
responsibility, the assumption is that a constitutional violation
has taken place-which mollifies any concerns of Parratt and
Daniels.5 Whether to hold a superior personally account-
able for the wrongs of subordinates presents a statutory
question left largely unaffected by constitutional cases such as
Parratt and Daniels.
251. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). Courts referring to Harris include: Walker v.
Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1455 (6th Cir. 1990) (relying on Harris to support a deliberate
indifference standard in a supervisory liability action); Wilks v. Young, 897 F.2d 896,
898 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on Harris in a supervisory liability context); Greason v.
Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 837 (11th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e find the analogous situation of
municipal liability under City of Canton to be helpful in determining whether a
supervisor was deliberately indifferent.... ."); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118
(3d Cir. 1989) ("[W]e are confident that, absent official immunity, the standard of
individual liability for supervisory public officials will be found to be no less stringent
than the standard of liability for the public entities that they serve." (relying on
Harris)).
252. 451 U.S. at 534-35.
253. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330.
254. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44; Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-33; see also
Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson
and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813, 846-49 (1987).
255. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 ("[Iun any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff
must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right.").
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Use of City of Canton v. Harris fares no better.256 Harris
dealt with holding local government responsible for its failure
to adequately train and supervise its police force. The Court
unanimously held that a city could only be held liable under
section 1983 for its "deliberate indifference" to the constitu-
tional rights of the victim.257 Because the Harris deliberate
indifference standard evolved from an institutional compro-
mise, however, it has no immediate application to cases
involving personal liability.258
D. Rationalizing a Singular Standard of Care
Nothing in Parratt, Daniels or Harris thus compels the
selection of any singular standard of fault under section 1983.
256. See, e.g., FONTANA, supra note 49, § 3.27, at 112 ("It is submitted that the
recent case of Canton ... signals the Supreme Court's affirmance of this [deliberate
indifference] standard for supervisory cases as well, since the elements of liability for
either claim are essentially similar." (citation omitted)). Professor Nahmod observes:
City of Canton could indicate that henceforth, and as a matter of § 1983
statutory interpretation, supervisory liability will require at least deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom subordinates come into contact.
It is argued... that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the Court's
declaration in Parratt v. Taylor ... that § 1983 does not have an independent
state of mind requirement.
NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.16, at 185 (Supp. 1990).
257. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380, 388 (1989). The deliberate
indifference standard adopted by the Court in Harris operates independently of the
Constitution. See id. at 388 n.8. Thus, even though equal protection is at issue,
purposeful discrimination need not be established on behalf of the municipality.
Rather, deliberate indifference is sufficient. See, e.g., Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep't,
739 F. Supp. 257, 262-63 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (relying on Harris in concluding that an
equal protection claim against officials may result in municipal liability if the city
was deliberately indifferent).
258. As discussed previously, see supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text,
Harris is an outgrowth of the Court's rejection of respondeat superior in Monell, and
therefore is wholly dependent for support upon the rationale of Monell. Monell's
reading of legislative history found the Forty-second Congress heavily influenced by
federalism concerns and the potential lack of federal authority to compel local
governments to keep the peace. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. That
the Forty-second Congress entertained these same concerns about supervisory
liability is doubtful indeed, especially when one considers that sovereign immunity
(including that found in the Eleventh Amendment) has never protected government
officials from personal liability. The Forty-second Congress certainly knew it was
free to choose whatever rule it wished, whether one predicated on vicarious liability,
some criminal analog demanding specific intent, or anything in between.
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The more challenging question is whether Parratt and Daniels
allow for any single standard of care for supervisors under
section 1983. Though Parratt and Daniels held that negli-
gence could support a section 1983 claim, they did not hold
that it necessarily would. Instead, the Court held that section
1983 depends on the substantive constitutional right at issue.
The result is a functional fault requirement for section 1983.
While gross negligence might be required for due process,259
purpose is required for equal protection. ° And certain
constitutional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against excessive force, might even be satisfied by
simple negligence.26'
In light of the flexible approach taken by Parratt and
Daniels, Professor Nahmod has argued that the level of fault
259. See Brown, supra note 254, at 867 (analyzing Daniels).
260. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). See generally
NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.16, at 171-72.
261. The Supreme Court has yet to clearly identify what level of mens rea is
needed for a Fourth Amendment violation. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989), the Court held that an arresting officer's "underlying intent or motivation" is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the force used to effectuate the arrest was
excessive. Id. at 397. Instead, the question is an objective one, such that "[a]n
officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an
objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional." Id. Graham left unanswered
whether intentional conduct is needed in the first instance to implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Whether an officer's accidentally causing injury to a suspect raises a
Fourth Amendment question, for example, was not resolved by Graham. In Brower
v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), the Court cast serious doubt on whether "acci-
dents" fall under Fourth Amendment scrutiny. There, a high speed chase resulted
in a suspect's crashing into a barricade set up by police. Brower v. County of Inyo,
817 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1987). The court of appeals found this not to constitute
a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 546-47. The Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that because the police intended to stop the suspect, "ter-
minat[ing] [his] freedom of movement through means intentionally applied," they had
in fact "seized" him. 489 U.S. at 597. In drawing this conclusion the Court
distinguished high speed chases that result in the suspect's "unexpectedly" crashing
his car. Id. at 595. No Fourth Amendment seizure occurs in such a case. Likewise,
the Court distinguished as involving no seizure that case where a police car "slips its
brake and pins a passerby against a wall." Id. at 596. Still, the Court stopped short
of saying that the harm must be intentionally brought about. Id. at 598-99. Hence,
even though harm is only negligently or recklessly brought on, it may be actionable
under the Fourth Amendment-at least where the means that bring about the harm
are "intentionally applied." See Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-
Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. LouIs U. L.J.
205, 278-80 (1991) (discussing the meaning of Brower); cf. California v. Hodari D.,
111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (holding that no seizure occurs for the purposes of the
exclusionary rule until a suspect is physically restrained).
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required for supervisory liability should also fluctuate with
that required for the constitutional violation at issue. 2
Under Professor Nahmod's approach, for example, a supervisor
is liable for a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
violation only if the supervisor possessed discriminatory
animus in failing to live up to his duties.263 Due process
would require gross negligence, and so on.
At first blush this functional approach to supervisory
liability under section 1983 has appeal. It has that degree of
symmetry normally appreciated by the law in that all govern-
ment officials, be they street-level or supervisory, are held to
the same flexible standard.264
In contrast, applying any unitary standard to supervisors
short of one based on specific intent265 could prove asym-
metrical in that a superior, depending on the constitutional
right at issue, could find himself bound by a higher standard
of care than his errant subordinate. For example, where due
process is the substantive right at issue, street-level officials
need only avoid recklessness; simple negligence will not
support liability.266 A uniform reasonableness standard for
supervisors, however, would require that they avoid neg-
ligence. Greater care would thus be required of supervisors
262. See NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.16, at 171.
263. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976) (holding that
discriminatory animus is required for an equal protection violation).
264. This does not mean that the supervisor and the subordinate-perpetrator
must possess the same level of culpability in a particular case. A supervisor's and
subordinate's mental state may differ, and yet they may both still be held account-
able. For instance, a subordinate may purposely (or even maliciously) injure
someone in violation of due process, while the supervisor was only reckless in
performing her duties. Assuming due process only requires super-carelessness, both
the supervisor and the subordinate are accountable. Equivalency of culpability
requirements is all that is needed. No similar consistency of actual blameworthiness
need be shown.
265. Requiring specific intent (i.e., purpose) would mean that the supervisor
is always at least as culpable as the perpetrator. Such a requirement, however,
would essentially equate supervisory liability with complicity theory, leaving it
almost impossible to ever hold supervisors responsible under § 1983. No one has yet
suggested such a draconian measure, and I do not entertain it as a serious suggestion
here.
266. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (holding that simple
negligence will not support a due process violation). Several lower courts have
interpreted this to mean that gross negligence or recklessness will support a due
process violation. See Brown, supra note 254, at 867 n.372 (collecting cases).
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than of the actual wrongdoers. The same could also prove true
for equal protection6 " and the Eighth Amendment.2 8
Additionally, one might always argue that a flexible ap-
proach based on constitutional fault is mandated by the
Court's treatment of section 1983 as a remedial statute.6 9
Because section 1983 has no substantive value, the argument
goes, it cannot generate a separate culpability standard for
supervisors. Rather, the standard of care required of supervi-
sors can only come from the substantive right at issue.
The response to the latter of these contentions is the same
as that made to the argument about duty-notwithstanding
rhetoric to the contrary, section 1983 has often been given
substantive meaning by the Court °.27  Responding to the
argument that imposing a higher standard of care on supervi-
sors is unfair (or unjust) when measured against what is
expected of street-level officials is more problematic. Part of
the challenge is inherent in the question of fairness. What is
fair or just to one person may not be to another. One there-
fore can never be certain that he has responded adequately to
the argument.
Still, even conceding the amorphous nature of fairness, an
equitable system may require more from supervisory officials
than street-level subordinates. Granted, disparate obligations
are often frowned upon by the law. Both tort law 271 and
267. For a subordinate to be held accountable under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment she must engage in purposeful discrimination.
See supra note 263. Anything less is insufficient to support liability. The care re-
quired of the subordinate is minimal, with only complete impunity being a lesser
standard. A supervisor held to a negligence standard, however, is required to act
objectively reasonably. More is expected of her. In fact, the supervisor could be held
accountable for the perpetrator's wrong notwithstanding the supervisor's lack of
purpose.
268. An Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation requires
deliberate indifference on behalf of state officials. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104-06 (1976).
269. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. Any argument framed
in terms of § 1983's "purely remedial mission" thus cannot be taken seriously. More
often than not such an argument is simply a contrived attempt to circumvent liability
under § 1983.
271. Under tort law a supervisor and her subordinate are generally held to the
same standard of care-one based on reasonableness. See MECHEM, supra note 42,
§ 789, at 529; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 132, at 1067. A few jurisdictions,
however, have imposed strict vicarious liability on supervisors for certain wrongful
acts of their subordinates. See, e.g., Salem Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitcomb, 362
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criminal law272 tend to require the same of people regardless
of their status. However, sometimes a person's status or rank
justifies differing treatment.
Consider again tort and criminal law's various exceptions to
the general requirement that one is only held accountable for
her actions and not her omissions.273 Persons of particular
status, such as parents, lifeguards, spouses, et cetera, are
often required to act in situations where others may stand idly
by.274 In effect, these persons are held to a higher standard
than the general citizenry.
True, these illustrations only speak to the law's occasional
relaxation of the act requirement and do not address allowing
for a relaxed level of mens rea. Still, they are indicative of
society's willingness to impose greater burdens on an indi-
vidual who has assumed a particular status or who otherwise
has adopted a specific role. Further illustrations can be found
with doctors, lawyers, and others who occupy a professional
status.275 Though the law speaks of "negligence" when
assessing these individuals' potential liability, it is clear that
more is expected of them than nonprofessionals. Similarly,
more can be expected of government supervisors.
One might always respond to these examples by arguing
that the same standard (reasonableness) is always being
applied; it merely varies in application with the particular
facts of each case. While doctors and lawyers are expected to
act reasonably, so are nonprofessionals. The theoretical
standard is always the same. The proposition that supervisors
should act reasonably while subordinates are enjoined only
from more culpable conduct, however, is a different matter.
N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); County of Monroe v. AFSCME Council 82,
456 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker,
301 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Va. 1983). In jurisdictions that abide by this approach supervisors
are in fact placed under a higher standard of care than their subordinates.
272. Under criminal law derivative liability is generally achieved only through
complicity liability and conspiracy theory, both of which require specific intent.
Because of this specific intent requirement one who is held derivatively liable by the
criminal law is always at least as culpable as the perpetrator. See LAFAVE & SCOTr,
supra note 106, § 6.7(b), at 579-80.
273. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
274. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 56, at 376-84.
275. See id. § 132, at 185-87. Society's expectations also can vary with the
activity at issue. Thus, one who uses explosives or engages in some other "ultrahaz-
ardous activity" might be held to a higher standard of care than others. See id. § 78,
at 551.
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The differing expectations flow not from application of an
otherwise uniform rule, but result from a standard that is
higher in theory.
Though this argument is based largely on semantics, it
deserves a response. The rejoinder is that the law in fact
recognizes graduated duties, stated as such, depending on the
status of the actor. Consider the doctrine of respondeat
superior. An employer is held absolutely responsible for the
negligence of her employee, so long as the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment.27 The employee, mean-
while, is responsible only for his own negligence.277 The
employer's strict standard of care thus requires more of her
than is required of the employee.
This need not suggest that supervisors too should be held
vicariously responsible for the wrongs of their subordinates.
As discussed above, precedent and policy dictate against
this."' Nor are the virtues of vicarious liability being trum-
peted here. Rather, private sector respondeat superior is
offered only to dispel any thought that disparate expectations
based on status are completely foreign to the law.
Several justifications exist for holding a private employer to
a stricter standard than his employee.279 Modern thought
accepts vicarious liability because it better allocates risks
among victims, employees, and the employer.28 ° The em-
ployer is in a position to better absorb risks and distribute the
corresponding cost as a part of doing business. Moreover, the
employer can command his employees and take the necessary
precautions to avoid injuries. Strict liability encourages
greater care from the person most able to provide it. 2"'
When the employer's ability to control her employees'
actions is coupled with her profit motive, the argument goes,
it is fair to expect more from her than the errant employee.
The employer has the ability to select and terminate person-
nel, as well as the power to direct their day to day operations.
She personally benefits from the activities she directs and has
the ability to order necessary changes. Given this control-
benefit formula, requiring an employer to pay for her employ-
ees' wrongs is a reasonable cost of doing business.2 2
276. See id. § 69, at 499-500.
277. See id. § 69, at 499.
278. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
279. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 44, § 69, at 500 (listing reasons).
280. See id.
281. See id. § 69, at 501.
282. See id. § 69, at 500-01.
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Courts have observed that upper-level government officials
are not analogous to employers in the private sector and
cannot be held responsible as such.2"3 Instead, supervisors
are more like foremen, wielding some control but not sharing
the employer's profit motive. The difference between private
employers and public supervisors, however, can be overstated.
Even though government supervisors may not have the
identical profit motive that drives private employers, and may
not exercise the same arbitrary employment power, they still
possess measures of both. For instance, a person occupying an
important position in government might expect continued
employment and a greater salary. And even those who do not
anticipate personal financial gain might expect to profit
politically.28 4
Further, supervisory control over subordinates, though not
plenary, can be substantial. Government officials are often
delegated a large measure of discretion when dealing with
subordinates.2"5 Even assuming a supervisor does not make
"final" personnel decisions, her authority might be so substan-
tial as to make her the virtual equivalent of an employer.2 8
Supervisory officials in government are thus not that
different from employers in the private sector. Granted, they
might be distinctive enough so that strict, vicarious liability
should not apply. But that is not what is being urged.
Instead, the suggestion here is only that a singular culpability
standard for supervisory personnel can be considered just
notwithstanding a more permissive, flexible standard for
street-level officials. Given the control exercised by supervi-
sory officials and their ability to profit politically from their
decisions, holding them to a more rigorous standard of care
than front-line officers is at least as fair as tort law's imposi-
tion of vicarious liability on private-sector employers.
283. See, e.g., Boettger v. Moore, 483 F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1973); Delaney v.
Dias, 415 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (D. Mass. 1976).
284. A police chief who wants to gain favor with the electorate (or their
representatives on the city council), for example, might decide to get tough on crime
and order more severe police surveillance. The result is more protection for the
general citizenry (and a happy electorate), but at a cost of several Fourth Amendment
violations. The police chief certainly has profited from his decision because he has
gained the favor of a vast majority of the citizens. Should he not be held accountable
(assuming culpability) for the unlawful activity that results as a "cost" of doing
business? Mere political accountability is insufficient, because those aggrieved make
up only a small percentage of the populace. A more immediate mechanism for
responsibility, such as an action for damages, would likely get the chief's attention.
285. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988).
286. See id.
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The policies behind section 1983 also warrant such an
approach. Professor Schuck has observed that "[high-level
supervisory or policymaking officials tend to be more visible,
financially capable of satisfying a judgment, and well posi-
tioned to change official policy. Moreover, their 'greater
power,'... 'affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless
conduct.'"27 Given the deterrent and compensatory pur-
poses behind section 1983, requiring more from these officials
seems sensible. Because they make and administer policy,
deterrence is more effectively served by addressing supervisory
officials directly.28 Compensation of victims also becomes
more of a reality when government supervisors are exposed to
liability. In short, the policies behind section 1983 would be
duly served by holding supervisors to a singular, stricter
standard of care than their street-level underlings.
As a final note, it bears repeating that this discussion
focuses on derivative supervisory liability. No attempt is made
here to hold a supervisor accountable in the first instance for
unconstitutional conduct. The assumption is that a constitu-
tional wrong has occurred at the hands of a street-level officer.
Therefore, no doctrinal problems are presented by holding a
supervisor to a higher standard of care than that required by
the Constitution. All constitutional requirements are satis-
fied; the question is only how far liability should extend.289
E. Identifying the Appropriate Standard
The law traditionally has expected everyone, including
government officials, to act reasonably. At the time when
section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was enacted, supervisory
officials were held accountable for their negligence in failing
to oversee their subordinates.29 ° Unless society's tolerance
of bad government has expanded so much as to justify
departure from this historical norm, negligence should still
provide the appropriate standard.
287. SCHUCK, supra note 19, at xvii-xviii (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 506 (1978)).
288. See id. at 16-17 ("Deterrence can be enhanced by encouraging supervision
and legal challenge, or blunted by shifting the risks of litigation and liability to
others.").
289. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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Requiring less of government officials than of the common
citizenry is a back-handed compliment at best. The message
conveyed to our government officials is that they are not as
moral and responsible as the rest of the populace and thus not
worthy of trust. Hopefully this is not the case at all; rather,
government officials presumably are as responsible as any
reasonable person.
For this reason, Judge Bownes of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit is certainly correct in stating, "If
the knowledge expected of government officials is that which
a reasonable person could be expected to have, the foresight
expected of government officials should be the same-that of
a reasonable person."291  Reasonableness should be the
standard by which supervisory officials are judged under
section 1983. An official in a control position who negligently
fails to oversee his subordinates should be held responsible for
constitutional violations that result. Those in high places
should not be heard to claim, "I didn't know," or "I wasn't
involved." Instead, society should expect government officials
to know and take action. It should be able to rely on a
government free from hierarchic negligence. Government
officials should earn their pay by reasonably performing their
duties. Such is the price of good government.
IV. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY WITH
SUBORDINATE'S INNOCENCE
Parts I through III assumed that a street-level subordinate
violated the Constitution. The question then was whether
derelict supervisors too should be held responsible. But what
if no constitutional violation occurs at the hands of the street-
level subordinate? More specifically, what if the street-level
subordinate does not possess the requisite mens rea? Can a
negligent supervisor still be held responsible?
Consider a case where a street-level subordinate wrong-
fully292 destroys property or somehow causes personal in-
293
jury. Assume the subordinate was only negligent in
291. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 826 (1st Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
292. By "wrongfully" I simply mean the damage should not have taken place.
293. See generally Brown, supra note 254, at 847-50 (discussing procedural due
process in the context of constitutional torts).
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causing the harm, or perhaps was not culpable at all.294
Assume further that the subordinate's supervisor was negli-
gent in failing to look after this particular street-level subordi-
nate. Is the supervisor personally responsible even though the
subordinate is not?
Applying the model for supervisory liability developed above,
one might conclude that the supervisor should be held
accountable. He was negligent (thus satisfying the require-
ment of section 1983)295 and harm was wrongfully inflicted on
the victim. The mere fortuity296 that the subordinate lacked
the requisite constitutional level of fault, the argument goes,
should not absolve the negligent supervisor of responsibility.
In the absence of constitutional fault on someone's behalf,
however, liability under section 1983 is precluded. 7  With-
out either the street-level subordinate or the supervisor
satisfying the due process fault standard, there is no substan-
tive claim. Thus, there can be no claim under section 1983.
Assuming again that the perpetrator is innocent of wrongdo-
ing, can a supervisor who satisfies the constitutional fault
standard be held accountable? No constitutional obstacle
would appear to preclude imposing liability in such a case
because constitutional fault exists on behalf of the supervisor.
But is there a nonconstitutional problem? Is it troubling that
294. Negligence, of course, cannot support a due process violation. See Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
60 U.S.L.W. 4182, 4186 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1992) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause does not
impose an independent federal obligation upon municipalities to provide certain
minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace.. . ."), affirming 916 F.2d 284
(5th Cir. 1990).
295. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
296. One might attempt to argue that no fortuity necessarily exists; rather, the
supervisor might have selected or trained the subordinate so as to avoid the sub-
ordinate's personal fault. A supervisor could do this in one of two ways: first, she
might select or train "smart" subordinates so that no wrong (and hence no fault)
exists; second, she might select or train "ignorant" subordinates in the hope that
should a wrong occur they will not, in light of their subjective ignorance, be found at
fault. If the first of these is true (that is, if the supervisor selects or trains smart
subordinates) then even assuming one of these subordinates were to cause harm,
there would exist no supervisory negligence. Such a choice would therefore not lead
to a situation where the subordinate was innocent but the supervisor was culpable.
Only under the second choice is there a possibility that the supervisor might be
deemed negligent while the subordinate escapes liability. But if the absence of fault
on behalf of the subordinate results not from a fortuity but from conscious selection
or training on behalf of the supervisor, the supervisor surely should be held account-
able. Otherwise, supervisors would be encouraged to select ignorant employees and
train them poorly. Hopefully, at best, the combination of an innocent subordinate
and culpable supervisor is the result of a fortuity.
297. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
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a person one step removed from the harm can be held respon-
sible when the perpetrator is innocent of wrongdoing?
Reference to either general tort principles or criminal law
would indicate that the answer is "no." Under the tort law
doctrines of negligent supervision and negligent entrustment,
for example, an employee need not be personally at fault for
a negligent employer to be held responsible.298 Similarly,
criminal law recognizes the so-called innocent agent theory of
liability, holding guilty one who uses another to commit a
crime notwithstanding the latter's subjective innocence.299
In either case, the innocent perpetrator is treated as a mere
instrumentality of the wrong. His innocence does not defeat
the liability of the person using him, just as the innocence of
a gun does not exculpate a murderer.
But the answer to whether section 1983 allows supervisory
liability in the absence of an employee's personal constitu-
tional fault is not so clear. Instead, the waters are muddied
by the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v.
Heller,300 a case that casts doubt on whether a supervisory
298. See, e.g., Robinson v. Moore, 512 S.W.2d 573, 575-78 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1974) (finding the employer liable but not the employee); Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co.,
97 S.W.2d 452, 453-54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936) (finding the cab company negligent
though the driver-an epileptic-was not). As one commentator explains:
[T]he employee's conduct need not itself be actionable before liability can be
imputed to the employer under negligent employment theories, unlike vicarious
liability theories. Employee incompetence will support a negligent hiring claim
against an employer when the plaintiff alleges that the employee possessed a
characteristic which created an unreasonable risk of harm, whether or not the
plaintiff alleges that the characteristic would render the employee personally
liable for the plaintiffs injury.
JAMES A. BRANCH, JR., NEGLIGENT HIRING PRACTICE MANUAL 16-17 (1988) (citation
omitted); see also 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 334 (1989) (noting than an "entrustee
may be relieved of liability for negligence, while the entrustor is not"). But see Lim
v. Interstate Sys. Steel Div., 435 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
there must be negligence on the part of the employee also).
299. See, e.g., State v. McCarthy, 425 A.2d 924, 932-35 (Conn. 1979) (holding
responsible a defendant who directed a drug-dependent follower to commit a murder,
even though the follower was not guilty of murder); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a)
(1962) ("A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when...
acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense,
he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct."). See
generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 comment 3 (1985).
300. 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam); cf Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 798
F.2d 1168, 1172-73 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
In Praprotnik it was argued that because certain officials were exonerated of
wrongdoing the city could not be held accountable. The Eighth Circuit disagreed,
finding that the jury could have determined that other unnamed officials were
responsible for the plaintiffs harm. Id.
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official's constitutional fault might be sufficient to sustain
liability where the subordinate proves innocent of wrongdoing.
A. City of Los Angeles v. Heller
In Heller a police officer was charged under section 1983
with unnecessarily using a chokehold to make an arrest, and
thereby causing the suspect to fall through a plate-glass
window.3 1' The municipality was also joined under section
1983 because it officially sanctioned use of the chokehold and
trained its officers how to employ the maneuver."2
In a bifurcated trial the jury first returned a verdict in favor
of the police officer.30 3 Because the jury was not instructed
on the possibility of a qualified immunity defense the verdict
apparently indicated that the police officer's use of force was
not unconstitutional. 30 4  The trial court then dismissed the
action against the municipality, concluding that if the agent
did not violate the Constitution then neither did the city.
30
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion.
Responding to the claim that the city's policy might itself have
been unconstitutional, the Court stated: "If a person has
suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might
have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is
quite beside the point."30 6  Thus, Heller ostensibly means
that so long as the perpetrator is innocent of wrongdoing, her
municipal employer cannot be held liable under section 1983,
notwithstanding the existence of a Monell policy or custom.
307
301. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 802 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
302. See id. at 801-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. See id. at 798.
304. See id. at 798-99. The court of appeals, however, did not interpret the
verdict in this way. It found that the jury might have concluded the officer was
entitled to a good faith defense because the force he used was reasonable according
to police department regulations. Heller, 759 F.2d at 1374.
305. See 475 U.S. at 798.
306. Id. at 799.
307. See, e.g., Frost v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 851 F.2d 822, 827 (6th
Cir.) (finding that a verdict that the perpetrators are not liable is "conclusive" as to
municipal liability), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827
F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that where the official -is not responsible the city
cannot be held liable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1007 (1988); In re Scott County, 672
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B. Heller's Impact on Supervisory Liability
Heller can be used to argue that a supervisor's authorization
of unconstitutional activity, and hence his complicity in it, is
"beside the point" if the subordinate did not personally violate
the Constitution. °" A fortiori, any lesser degree of culpa-
bility on behalf of the supervisor is irrelevant so long as the
subordinate is innocent of constitutional wrongdoing. Without
constitutional fault on behalf of the subordinate, there can be
no cause of action against the supervisor.
Lower courts have not read Heller to preclude supervisory
liability in the absence of a subordinate's constitutional fault.
Instead, both before °9 and after310 Heller, courts have rec-
ognized the potential for derivative liability regardless of the
perpetrator's innocence, so long as the "accomplice" is constitu-
tionally blameworthy. Unfortunately, post-Heller cases have
F. Supp. 1152, 1187 (D. Minn. 1987) ("[Pllaintiffs have not suffered any constitutional
harm at the hands of the deputies or the social workers, hence, their failure to train
or supervise theory against Scott County must fail."), affd, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir.
1989). But see, e.g., Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1519-21 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that the municipality may be liable for its policies notwithstanding the fact
that the government tortfeasor was found not liable because he was not acting under
color of law).
Where the perpetrator escapes liability because of immunity, however, the
governmental employer can still be held liable. See, e.g., Newcomb v. City of Troy,
719 F. Supp. 1408, 1416-17 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Where immunity protects the
tortfeasor a constitutional violation might still have taken place; therefore, the
government employer (which is not protected by immunity) is still potentially
accountable.
308. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1494, 1498 (S.D. Fla.
1989) ("[Bjecause the liability of [supervisors] is derivative, [where the perpetrator
is innocent] they could neither have committed a constitutional infraction."),
reconsideration denied, 729 F. Supp. 1329 (1990).
309. See, e.g., Professional Ass'n of College Educators, TSTAINEA v. El Paso
Community College Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 266 & n.14 (5th Cir.) (holding that the
president of a college was liable under § 1983 for retaliating against a union member
in violation of the First Amendment notwithstanding the innocence of the intermedi-
ate board of trustees that acted on the president's recommendation), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 881 (1984).
310. See, e.g., Gibson, 910 F.2d at 1519-22 (holding that a police officer was
not liable under § 1983 because he was not acting under color of state law, but that
the city was possibly liable for the officer's actions); Wulfv. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d
842, 862-64 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding the police chief personally liable because of his
improper motive but not the city manager whose conduct was not impermissibly
motivated); Jacobs v. Meister, 775 P.2d. 254, 258-59 (N.M. Ct. App.) (holding that
improper motive on the part of an administrator results in liability notwithstanding
the innocence of the regents), cert. denied, 775 P.2d 1299 (N.M. 1989). But see
Gutierrez, 723 F. Supp. at 1498 (excusing supervisors where the perpetrators were
innocent).
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failed to explain why this is so. Though these decisions seem
correct, Heller still warrants distinction.
Of course, the best way to distinguish Heller is to point to its
institutional character. Again, the rules governing the
liability of local government trace their origin to policies
foreign to individual-capacity actions.31' One should there-
fore be wary of mechanically applying a case like Heller to
supervisors.
Even assuming Heller's relevance in the supervisory liability
context, it is still doubtful that it precludes an innocent-agent
theory of liability. On a number of occasions the Court has
recognized that institutional responsibility for constitutional
wrongs need not be premised on any given individual's
liability.312 Instead, the Court has often analyzed institu-
tional responsibility independently of official liability."3
311. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
312. The Court on a number of occasions has found illegal institutional action
without identifying any one individual as being personally liable. In particular,
school desegregation cases have always allowed for institutional responsibility
without looking for any individual wrongdoer. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); cf Christina B. Whitman, Government
Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 257 (1986) (noting that
the school desegregation cases can be explained under the traditional theory that
requires one individual to be responsible, but that the cases also suggest a possible
movement away from the individual model). The Court has never suggested that to
hold a state agency responsible for de facto discrimination an individual official must
be identified as possessing discriminatory animus. Instead, the question in de facto
discrimination cases is whether there exists some form of collective intent to discrimi-
nate on the part of the relevant institution.
This position is consistent with that normally taken in regard to corporate
criminal responsibility. "Corporations have been convicted of crimes requiring
knowledge on the basis of the 'collective knowledge' of the employees as a group, even
though no single employee possessed sufficient information to know that the crime
was being committed." Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (1979).
313. The possibility exists that no one individual could ever be held personally
responsible for an otherwise conceded constitutional violation. This is because
multiple requirements sometimes exist for a given constitutional violation. Consider
equal protection, for example, which requires (1) purposeful discrimination, see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976), and (2) discriminatory effect, see,
e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,225 (1971). One component of an institution
might satisfy the intent element, while another component causes the discriminatory
effect. Together they cause a violation, although separately they do not. See
Whitman, supra note 312, at 261 ("[A]t least when there are explicit, decisive, and
virtually contemporaneous actions by several top decisionmakers, the Court will
recognize that several branches of the government, working together, can create a
constitutional tort even though the action of any single branch is not by itself
unconstitutional.").
Additionally, consider due process. In order to prove a violation of due process
through government defamation one must establish (1) disparaging remarks, and
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That the Court intended Heller to limit institutional liability
to those cases where an identifiable subordinate is constitu-
tionally at fault is therefore an improbable proposition.
Because of this precedent and the law's general recognition
that one person's innocence need not devolve to benefit a
guilty party,314 Heller is best read narrowly. Specifically,
Heller can be interpreted as a case that addresses only what
relief is available under section 1983,'3 1 and not as establish-
ing any general rules of liability. When viewed in this manner
Heller does not preclude an innocent-agent theory of liability
under section 1983, whether the case involves institutional or
individual liability.
C. Explaining Heller
Constitutional tort cases encompass two separate questions.
The first asks whether a constitutional violation has taken
place. The second asks whether the victim is entitled to
(2) a loss of government employment. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
Municipal officials might combine to violate the Constitution even though no single
official has acted illegally. See Whitman, supra note 312, at 256-57.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), provides an excellent case
study. See Whitman, supra note 312, at 261. There a municipal employee (Owen)
was allegedly discharged in violation of the due process principles established in Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976). See Owen, 445 U.S. at 633-34 n.13 The
supervisor responsible for the discharge (the City Manager) did not defame Owen,
rather members of the City Council did. The City Council, meanwhile, did not
discharge Owen. Id. at 627-29. Thus, neither the City Manager who discharged
Owen, nor the members of the City Council who defamed him, satisfied the due
process requirements described above. Though the Court in Owen never made clear
whether either the City Manager or the members of the City Council individually
violated the Constitution, it did make clear that due process was violated. Id. at
633-34 n.13. It might be said that the violation occurred as a result of the combined
acts of the City Council and the City Manager. Taken together the acts implicated
the municipality, even though apparently no single official could be held accountable.
Of course, if the City Manager and members of the City Council had conspired to
violate due process then all would be equally guilty. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Nothing in Owen, however, suggests preconcerted activity took
place.
314. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
315. The Court in Heller implied as much when it stated: "But this was an
action for damages, and neither Monell ... nor any other of our cases authorizes the
award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its
officers when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional
harm." 475 U.S. at 799.
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relief.316 Even if one assumes a constitutional wrong has
occurred relief might not be available, either because of a lack
of harm or perhaps because of a justification or immunity.
Consider, for example, a mixed motive case arising under
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Assume
a woman is discharged from public employment and that the
decision to fire her was based in part on her gender. The
employer's discriminatory animus establishes the constitu-
tional violation, a necessary predicate for recovery under
section 1983."'7 But this alone does not lead to recovery.
Instead, should the employer prove that a neutral motivation
was the true moving force behind the discharge-that she
would have been fired regardless of the employer's discrimina-
tory animus-the plaintiff will not recover damages. 31" The
316. See NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.18, at 195-96 (Supp. 1990). One
commentator has noted:
Section 1983 operates on at least two levels: first, on a level of statutory
liability which is "absolute and unqualified" with "no mention . .. of any
privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted"; and, second, on the
level of an action at law for tort liability "for which the court will provide a
remedy in the form of an action for damages."
Judicial remedies have always been distinguished from the law of substance
and procedure.
Richard G. Carlisle, The Evolution of Section 1983-Verdict in on Liability But Jury
out on Remedy, in SECTION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD, supra note 227, at 375, 377
(citation omitted).
317. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
286-87 (1977). Professor Nahmod has observed:
[I]n a mixed motive case the second part of the Mount Healthy test goes to
remedy and not to the existence of a constitutional violation. That is, even
where a defendant has carried the Mount Healthy burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that an impermissible motivation was not the
but-for cause of a plaintiffs discharge, the plaintiff who has proved that the
impermissible motivation was a substantial factor in the discharge has thereby
proved a constitutional violation of, say, the First Amendment or equal protection.
NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.18, at 196 (Supp. 1990). But see Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). Professor Nahmod observes that Hopkins might
indicate even the second question goes to whether violation has taken place.
NAHMOD, supra note 32, § 3.18, at 196.
318. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286-87. But, if the impermissible motive
was a substantial factor in the discharge, the plaintiff "may be able to recover
compensatory damages-for emotional distress, for example-stemming from that
violation, even if he or she is not entitled to recover any damages resulting from the dis-
charge itself. There also may be attorney's fees consequences." NAHMOD, supra note
32, § 3.18, at 196 (Supp. 1990); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260-62 (1978).
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nondiscriminatory reason breaks the causal connection
necessary to recovery.
Returning to Heller, recovery from the municipality was
improper because nothing the municipality did caused Heller
compensable damage. The arresting officer in Heller was
"exonerated" by the jury.319  The force he used to make the
arrest was therefore reasonable,32 ° a determination that
severed any causal link between the illegal municipal policy
and Heller's injuries.32' Just as a neutral motive can break
the causal connection between discriminatory animus and
termination of employment, justifiable force can sever the link
between an unlawful arrest policy and a suspect's injuries.322
Heller therefore could not challenge the municipal policy in an
action for damages.323
Heller applies only in those cases where some independent
intervening event, such as an objective justification, severs the
connection between an illegality (such as an unlawful mu-
nicipal policy or a supervisor's constitutional fault) and the
victim's injury.324 Where a violation is avoided only because
of the subordinate's subjective innocence, however, whether
brought on by a mistake or some other excuse, Heller is
irrelevant.
To illustrate this distinction, consider again the mixed
motive hypothetical discussed above. Assume that a supervi-
sor instructs one of her subordinates to discharge an employee,
and further assume that both the supervisor and the subordi-
nate have discriminatory animus. If it can be established that
319. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986).
320. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Court held that the
question of justification or exoneration in an excessive force case is one that turns on
objective factors and not the arresting officer's subjective intent. Id. at 397. Hence,
Graham makes it clear that a jury verdict exonerating a police officer in an excessive
force case necessarily must mean that the officer's actions were objectively
reasonable. The verdict exonerating the officer cannot be based on an absence of
malicious subjective intent. For this reason, subjective excuses will not normally
defeat liability in an excessive force case, and the result in Heller should always
obtain.
321. But see Heller, 475 U.S. at 803-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
the jury may have concluded that the officer's actions were subjectively reasonable
while the city's policy was objectively unreasonable).
322. See id. at 799.
323. Under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), Heller would not
have had standing to seek injunctive relief either.
324. An external event normally will arise because of the victim's own actions
or perhaps through circumstances beyond anyone's control: events that either justify
or excuse the street-level subordinate's response.
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the victim would have been discharged anyway (that is,
regardless of the impermissible animus), there can be no
recovery.325 If the discharge is justified by, say, poor job
performance or misconduct, the link between the supervisor's
impermissible motive and the discharge is broken. 2 ' Nei-
ther the subordinate's nor the supervisor's discriminatory
animus leads to liability.
Now assume that it cannot be established that the discharge
would have taken place anyway. 327 And further assume that
the subordinate is oblivious to the supervisor's improper
motive. Under these facts the supervisor is accountable.
3 8
That the subordinate who carries out the discharge is excused
because of her subjective innocence does not relieve the
supervisor of liability. What is important is not the
subordinate's innocence, but causation-specifically, whether
external, objective factors break the connection between the
harm and the supervisor's wrongdoing. A subordinate's lack
of subjective culpability does not break the causal chain.
Finally, return again to the hypothetical case where a street-
level subordinate negligently destroys property or causes
personal injury.329 Of course, this subordinate cannot be
held responsible for a due process violation because such a
325. See Professional Ass'n of College Educators, TSTA/NEA v. El Paso County
Community College Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 266 & nn.13-14 (5th Cir.) ("The causation
issue ... is purely factual: did retaliation for protected activity cause the termina-
tion in the sense that the termination would not have occurred in its absence?"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
326. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Meister, 775 P.2d 254, 258 (N.M. Ct. App.) (noting that
a subsequent, independent decision to discharge can break the causal connection
between an improper motive and termination of employment), cert. denied, 775 P.2d
1299 (N.M. 1989).
327. See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). In Wulf
a public employee working with the police department was discharged in violation of
the First Amendment. The police chief, who recommended the discharge to the
mayor, possessed the impermissible motive to fire the plaintiff because of a letter the
plaintiff wrote to the attorney general. Id. at 848, 862-64. The mayor, however, pos-
sessed no wrongful intent. Id. at 863. Still, although the mayor actually fired the
plaintiff, the court found that the police chief could be held accountable for the harm
under § 1983 because his recommendation "caused" the discharge. Id. at 862-64.
The innocence of the mayor was irrelevant.
328. See, e.g., Wulf, 883 F.2d at 862-63; Professional Ass'n of College Educa-
tors, 730 F.2d at 266 (stating that the issue is whether an improper motive caused
the intermediary to discharge plaintiff); Jacobs, 775 P.2d at 258 (noting that the fact
that the party terminating the plaintiffs job is innocent does not break the causal
connection between the defendant's improper motive and the discharge).
329. See supra notes 292-98 and accompanying text.
FALL 19911
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 25:1
violation requires more than mere negligence.3 ° We have
already seen that a negligent supervisor in this situation
cannot be held liable under section 1983.33 ' But can a super-
visor who is grossly negligent in either training or supervising
that subordinate be held accountable? The answer is "yes,"
notwithstanding Heller, so long as no objective justification
exists for the subordinate's actions. The perpetrator's personal
constitutional innocence cannot immunize a supervisor who
possesses constitutional fault.
Drawing perfect harmony between the negligence model
urged for derivative supervisory liability in Part III, where the
subordinate has committed a constitutional violation, and the
conclusion reached here unfortunately is impossible. Daniels
is in the way. Negligence will support supervisory liability
only in those cases where the street-level subordinate person-
ally violates the Constitution. Where the subordinate's fault
does not satisfy the constitutional predicate, however, supervi-
sory negligence would support liability only in the rare case
where negligence forms the constitutional rule.
There is no satisfactory explanation for allowing a negligent
supervisor to escape liability based solely upon his subordi-
nate's lack of constitutional fault. In either case the harm to
the victim is the same. Corrective justice would seem to
require holding the supervisor accountable in either case. 32
One might argue that this deficiency sabotages altogether
the use of negligence to support derivative supervisory
liability. Working backwards, one can argue that if indepen-
dent constitutional fault is required of the supervisor where
the subordinate is innocent, it should also be required where
the subordinate is liable.
330. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
331. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
332. Granted, this "gap" in supervisory accountability under § 1983 looks a bit
like the gap between respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. Under
respondeat superior the principal is responsible for the agent's torts committed in the
scope of employment, regardless of the principal's fault. Negligent entrustment,
however, holds the principal accountable only for her own fault, irrespective of the
agent's negligence. See BRANCH, supra note 298, at 15-17. One might observe a
'gap" in that the principal's standard of care (absolute liability versus negligence)
turns on the fortuity of her agent's fault. See supra note 296.
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Rather than supporting a retraction of supervisory liability
based on negligence, however, I believe this reasoning bolsters
extending the negligence standard to cases involving innocent
subordinates. Government officials occupying supervisory
positions should reasonably oversee those charged to their
care, and should compensate the victims of their failures. The
fortuity that a subordinate escapes liability because he lacks
some required subjective mens rea should not absolve an
otherwise negligent supervisor. Section 1983's deterrence
rationale and compensatory purpose are as strong in this case
as in one where the subordinate possesses subjective fault.
CONCLUSION
An old Chinese proverb states that "when the finger points
at the moon, the idiot looks at the finger."333  Given the
specific facts of the Iran-Contra affair, it appears quite clear
that the finger is pointing to the moon and beyond.334 What
is not clear, however, is whether our modern morality allows
us to look beyond the tip of the finger. If we are caught in a
web of "ignorance is bliss," we will not look any farther. We
will accept assertions like, "I didn't know," or "It wasn't me,"
and dutifully turn to sever the offensive finger.
Maybe we are satisfied with this approach in the criminal
context, but we need not extend it to the civil sphere. Years
of precedent support a less tolerant view of government
incompetence. Indeed, in times past society has expected the
same of those in government as it requires of its other
citizens. Only in the past twenty years have the courts turned
from this egalitarian principle and granted government
officials room to play.335
Given that no precedent, whether congressional or judicial,
compels a relaxation of traditional expectations, something
else must explain the recent growth of impunity for those in
the governmental hierarchy. One can imagine two different
explanations: our courts either have overlooked society's
333. See Hitchens, supra note 3, at 71.
334. See supra notes 2-16 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
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traditional distaste for incompetence in government, or they
are forging a new, anything-goes morality.336 We should
hope that the former explanation is the more accurate one.
That can be corrected.
336. In a recent critical analysis of tort law Professor Abel offered the
following observation:
Tort law fails almost entirely to pass moral judgment on the infliction of risk
and injury. Negligent behavior is a public as well as a private wrong because
it endangers many people besides the victim. It therefore merits the public
disapproval that only the state can express in order to reaffirm the norm of
safety.
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 819 (1990). This is
especially true in relation to constitutional torts. By holding our government officials
to a negligence standard, courts can make a moral statement denouncing the public
wrong of incompetence in government. Anything less is an equally moral statement
that the public at large is not worth protecting.
